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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
V. : 
LETHRON D. TATE, : Case No. 981793-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION 
Issue: Whether the use of hearsay and multiple hearsay 
testimony by a police officer at an order to show cause hearing 
as the only evidence to establish that Appellant failed to comply 
with the terms of probation violates Appellant's right to 
confrontation and due process? 
Standard of Review: This issue involves a question of law 
which is reviewed for correctness. See Layton City v. Peronek, 
803 P.2d 1294 (Utah App. 1990)(without explicitly stating 
standard of review, applying correctness standard in concluding 
that the use of hearsay at a probation violation hearing violated 
due process); see generally State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 
(Utah 1994) (appellate courts review a trial judge's determination 
of the law for correctness). 
Preservation of the Argument: This argument is preserved at 
R. 88:1-2. A copy of the entire transcript of the Order to Show 
Cause hearing (R. 88) is in Addendum A. 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The text of the following relevant statutes, rules and 
constitutional provisions is contained in Addendum B. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 1998); 
Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution; 
Sixth Amendment, United States Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In an Information dated January 30, 1997, the state charged 
Appellant/Defendant Lethron Demetrius Tate ("Appellant," 
"Lethron" or "Tate") with one count of robbery, a second degree 
felony. (R. 5-6) On March 3, 1997, Appellant pled guilty to 
attempted robbery, a third degree felony. (R. 17) 
On April 21, 1997, the trial judge entered judgment. 
(R. 27) He sentenced Tate to serve zero to five years at the 
Utah State Prison, but stayed the sentence and placed Appellant 
on probation for three years. (R. 27-8) A copy of the Judgment 
is in Addendum C. 
On July 15, 1998, Adult Probation and Parole ("AP&P") filed 
a Progress/Violation Report and Affidavit in Support of Order to 
Show Cause, alleging that Tate had violated his probation in that 
he had committed the crime of Aggravated Assault. (R. 33-5) The 
judge issued an Order to Show Cause on July 15, 1998. (R. 38-9) 
Tate denied the allegation, and the judge scheduled an 
evidentiary hearing for August 11, 1998. (R. 49-50) 
The state was unable to proceed at the evidentiary hearing 
on the Order to Show Cause, and the trial judge dismissed the 
2 
Order to Show Cause. (R. 49) On August 27, 1998, AP&P filed a 
second Progress/Violation Report and an Amended Affidavit in 
Support of Order to Show Cause. (R. 51-4) The second violation 
report and Amended Affidavit alleged that Tate violated his 
probation by committing the offense of aggravated assault and an 
additional offense of forgery. (R. 51-4) Copies of the second 
Progress/Violation Report and the Amended Affidavit are in 
Addendum D. 
Tate denied both allegations. (R. 59) An evidentiary 
hearing was held on October 27, 1998. (R. 64) The trial judge 
determined that Tate had violated his probation in regard to both 
allegations, and imposed the original sentence of zero to five 
years at the Utah State Prison. (R. 64-5) The trial judge 
entered his order revoking probation on October 28, 1998. 
(R. 64-5) Tate filed a timely Notice of Appeal on November 4, 
1998, appealing from this order. (R. 72) A copy of the order 
being appealed is in Addendum E. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At the Order to Show Cause hearing, the state did not 
present any of the witnesses to the two crimes it alleged that 
Appellant had committed. Instead, the state presented the 
testimony of the investigating officers, who recounted hearsay 
and multiple hearsay statements which potential witnesses had 
made to the officers. 
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1. Allegation That Appellant Committed Forgeries 
Officer Richard Boddy was the only witness offered in 
support of allegation number 2, the claim that Tate had committed 
the crime of forgery. Officer Boddy testified that he 
investigated a complaint of forgery at a Denny's Restaurant 
located in West Valley City. (R. 88:3) The officer testified 
that he collected five checks which were drawn on the account of 
Brenda Woelfel. (R. 4, 6)1 
Officer Boddy testified that Woelfel told him that new 
checks had been sent to her but taken out of her mailbox before 
she received them, and "passed all over town, and quite a few of 
them at Denny's." (R. 88:5) The officer had shown the five 
checks he had which were made out to Denny's to Woelfel, and "had 
statements from her saying that she was not the author of those 
checks." (R. 88:5) Boddy also testified that Woelfel told him 
that she had not authorized anyone else to use the checks. 
(R. 88:5) The five checks were made out for $70.33, $59.87, 
$51.76, $80.25, and $80.50. (R. 88:8) 
Additionally, Boddy testified that he talked to Larry 
Thompson, the manager at Denny's. (R. 88:7) Boddy testified 
1
 Officer Boddy testified that his forgery investigation 
actually involved 27 checks which had been passed at Denny's. 
(R. 88:4) The checks came from two different accounts held by two 
different individuals at two different banks. (R. 88:4) Most of 
the checks were drawn on the account of Antonio Ascencio. 
(R. 88:4, 6) Boddy never spoke with Ascencio, however, and 
clarified during the course of his testimony that the checks drawn 
on Mr. Ascencio's account were not relevant to the Order to Show 
Cause hearing because officers were unable to establish who had 
passed those checks. (R. 88:5, 6) 
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that Thompson told him that Thompson "was told by the banks, and 
because of the affidavits that were filed by the victim on the 
checks, in this case Brenda Woelfel, that these checks were again 
not authored by herself and that she at no time ever issued, 
wrote or authored any of the checks at the Denny's." (R. 88:7) 
Boddy testified further that Thompson told him the checks were 
returned to Denny's unpaid. (R. 88:7) 
Boddy also recounted that he had conversations with Thompson 
which led to a suspect. (R. 88:8) Thompson mentioned the names 
of three employees, Julie Marks, Elizabeth Price and Tate, as 
well as the name of Amanda Calouza, who was not an employee. 
(R. 88:8) This led the officer to talk with Marks and Price. 
(R. 88:9, 10) 
Boddy testified that Marks told him Price had possessed two 
of the checks and wanted Marks to fill them out. (R. 88:12, 16) 
When Marks refused, Price said, "I'll get Lethron to do it." 
(R. 88:16) Boddy said Marks told him that "Lethron was working 
as a server that evening, and they wrote out of the checks, and 
then went up to the register and gave Lethron the checks and he 
then gave her the money for them." (R. 88:12-13) It is unclear 
who, in addition to Price, comprised the "they" who wrote out the 
checks. Boddy also said that Marks told him that she did not see 
Appellant pass any checks. (R. 88:9) 
Although Marks did not see Appellant pass any checks 
(R. 88:9), according to Officer Boddy, Marks told him she had 
further "knowledge that Lethron Tate had passed a couple of 
5 
checks there through Elizabeth Price"; Boddy also said Marks told 
him she "was privy to the information and the conversations 
between Lethron Tate and Elizabeth Price." (R. 88:9) The 
officer summarized the information he received from Marks: 
that the checks were indeed stolen, they were being 
passed and the blame was being passed back and forth as 
to who was going to take the fall for this. Statements 
by Lethron Tate to Elizabeth Price that, you know, he 
wasn't going down alone, that everyone else was going 
to go with us, as well, and this included Amanda 
Calouza, his girlfriend. 
(R. 88:9-10) 
The officer testified as to this general information, but 
did not provide any specifics as to the content of the 
conversations Marks supposedly overheard between Tate and Price. 
(R. 88:17) This is because Marks did not include the contents of 
the conversations in her statement. (R. 88:17-18) Marks did 
indicate, however, that " [Price] had called her and said that she 
had just talked to Lethron and she had told him that she was 
going to blame everything on him, and he had said, 'what?,' and 
she said what else was she to do, she has four kids." (R.88:18) 
Officer Boddy also testified regarding statements Price had 
made to him. (R. 88:10-11) Price initially told him that she 
had worked at Denny's for five years and did not know who was 
writing the checks. (R. 88:10, 15) Although she initially 
denied involvement, Price "changed and recanted her story" after 
Marks told the officer about Price's involvement and after Price 
was confronted by the officer regarding her participation. 
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(R. 88:10, 17)2 After she knew she was in trouble, Price 
pointed her finger at Tate, and told Boddy Tate was involved. 
(R. 88:18-19) 
Boddy also testified 
in a post-Miranda statement, [Price] admitted to 
accepting two or three of the checks. And I say two or 
three because she wasn't sure how many she had gotten, 
and that she had gotten those directly from Lethron at 
Denny's, and that she had received money in return for 
those checks. 
(R. 88:10) According to Boddy, Price also told him that "she 
knew that Lethron Tate was keeping [the checks] either in the 
house or in his vehicle, and he was the one who actually came to 
her when she cashed out for meals at Denny's." (R. 88:11) 
Boddy also indicated that Price told him that Appellant had 
presented three of the checks, and Appellant's girlfriend, Amanda 
Calouza, had passed five of the checks. (R. 88:ll)3 After 
referring to his report4, Boddy stated that Price told him that 
"she took a total of six checks," all of which "were handed to 
2
 The officer testified that when he confronted Price with 
the checks, "we" presented the checks to Price. (R. 88:10) He did 
not indicate who besides himself was present and helped present the 
checks to Price when this occurred. (R. 88:10) 
3
 The officer's reference to eight checks is not consistent 
with his prior testimony that only five checks were relevant to the 
Order to Show Cause hearing. (See R. 88:4, 6, 11) It is not clear 
from the record that the checks attributed to Appellant through the 
officer's hearsay testimony were checks drawn on Woelfel's account. 
Indeed, at least three of the checks apparently were not drawn on 
Woelfel's account since only five of her checks were passed at 
Denny's. (R. 88:6) 
4
 The officer could not remember all of what the witnesses 
had told him and referred to his report during the course of his 
testimony in answering questions. (R. 88:11, 12) 
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her by Tate. And on one occasion, she took one check from 
Calouza, which included the meal and cash back." (R. 88:11) 
Boddy also said Price told him she had not seen Tate fill out the 
checks, and that both she and Tate got money from the checks. 
(R. 88:12) 
Price was charged with several forgeries. She entered into 
a plea bargain, with at least one of the charges being dismissed 
and the state agreeing to make sentencing recommendations for 
probation. (R. 88:20) 
2. Allegation That Appellant Committed Aggravated 
Assault 
In allegation number 1, the state claimed that Appellant had 
violated his probation by committing the crime of aggravated 
assault.5 In support of this allegation, the state relied 
solely on the hearsay testimony of two police officers. Officer 
Gilbert Salazar responded to a call on April 29, 1998, at about 
10:00 p.m. (R. 88:28) He arrived at a fast food parking lot 
located at 13 00 East 2100 South in Salt Lake City where he saw a 
man who appeared to have been beaten up. (R. 88:29) Salazar 
testified that the injured man, Steven Hanson, told him, "a black 
guy beat him up." (R. 88:29) 
The witness who had called the police had not seen the 
5
 AP&P had previously filed a Progress/Violation Report 
containing this allegation. (R. 33-34) The state was unable to 
proceed at the Order to Show Cause hearing, and the judge dismissed 
the Order to Show Cause. (R. 49) The state was also unable to 
proceed at the preliminary hearing on the aggravated assault charge 
because witnesses were not available; the magistrate continued the 
preliminary hearing. (R. 49) 
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fight. (R. 88:30) Salazar testified that the unnamed witness 
told him that a car had rapidly left the parking lot, and that a 
restaurant hat and shirt fell off the car. (R. 88:30) The shirt 
had the name tag "Josh" on it. (R. 88:30) 
By telephone, Officer Salazar contacted a "Josh" who worked 
at the restaurant. (R. 88:31) The officer could not remember 
Josh's last name, and there were apparently two Joshes at the 
restaurant. (R. 88:31, 34, 35, 39) Salazar testified that 
"Josh" told him over the phone "that a friend of his named Tate 
was the one that assaulted the victim." (R. 88:31)6 
Working from "independent recollection" rather than a police 
report, the officer testified that "Josh" "said the victim came 
out and there were some words exchanged and the victim was 
assaulted by the suspect. And Josh told [the officer] over the 
phone that he kept on telling the suspect to stop beating him." 
(R. 88:31) 
Officer Kelly Kent was assigned to do follow-up 
investigation. (R. 88:33-4) She spoke to Josh Marquette, an 
employee of the restaurant. (R. 88:34) Josh Marquette told the 
officer 
he and some friends were standing outside of the 
restaurant in the parking lot, and that our victim had 
been in the restaurant and came out. There was some 
6
 On cross-examination, Officer Salazar acknowledged that 
while he could not remember exactly, "Josh" might have said the 
person's name was Lethron rather than Tate, but at any rate, that 
Josh could supply only a single name. (R. 88:32) Officer Kelly 
testified that when Josh Wagstaff talked to him, he referred to the 
person as "Lee," and told the officer Lee lived with Amanda 
Calouza. (R. 88:35) 
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words exchanged over a Jazz game that had just 
happened. They were making comments back and forth. 
And that a young man named Lee or Lethron, is what he 
knew, that was a friend of an ex-co-worker, who was 
also present, and that he had gone over and that he had 
assaulted our victim. 
(R. 88:37) Josh Marquette did not give the officer details about 
what had occurred; "[h]e just said that there was an assault, 
that he had seen him a couple of times, that he just whacked him 
real hard and the kid went down." (R. 88:34) 
Officer Kent testified that Josh Wagstaff, who was also an 
employee, told her that "there were some words exchanged and that 
Lee, as he knew him, had assaulted Mr. Hanson, our victim." 
(R. 88:35) According to Officer Kelly, Josh Wagstaff told her 
that "the word exchange had to do with the Jazz game and that the 
Jazz sucked. And he said that Lethron and Josh Marquette were 
both over with the victim when the assault happened, that 
Marquette had actually walked over with Lethron Tate over to the 
victim, Mr. Hanson." (R. 88:39) 
Officer Kent also spoke with Hanson. (R. 88:35) Kent 
testified that Hanson told her he had been unconscious for awhile 
and could not remember much except that "there was some exchanges 
of words and that out of nowhere this black male that was in the 
parking lot hit him, and that's what he remembered of the 
assault." (R. 88:36) He was somewhat vague as to what occurred. 
(R. 88:39) According to the officer, Hanson picked Appellant out 
of a photo spread, but said that the hair was different. 
(R. 88:35-6) 
10 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant's rights to confrontation and due process were 
violated when the trial judge revoked his probation, relying 
solely on hearsay evidence which was admitted without a finding 
of good cause. Minimum requirements of due process apply to a 
probation revocation hearing. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 
489 (1972); Gacrnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973). These 
minimum requirements include "the right to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer 
specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation)." 
Gacrnon, 411 U.S. at 786 (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S at 489). 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12) (d) (iii) (Supp. 1998) codifies this 
requirement. 
The trial judge must explicitly make a finding that good 
cause exists prior to admission of the hearsay in order to 
constitutionally admit hearsay at a revocation hearing. In this 
case where the trial judge did not make such a finding, 
Appellant's right to due process was violated. 
Alternatively, assuming arguendo this Court could review the 
record to determine whether good cause existed, the record in 
this case fails to suggest good cause for not allowing 
confrontation. The state did not offer any legal or factual 
reason for presenting only the testimony of the officers who 
investigated the crimes alleged in the Order to Show Cause, 
rather than the testimony of the purported wd tnesses to the use 
alleged crimes. 
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Moreover, even if good cause existed to allow the admission 
of the hearsay, the hearsay was so unreliable that its admission 
violated due process. In regard to the allegation that Tate 
violated probation by committing forgery, the only evidence 
indicating Tate was involved in a forgery was hearsay and 
multiple hearsay statements made by a codefendant. 
Admission and reliance on the codefendant's hearsay and 
double hearsay statements implicating Tate violated due process. 
The codefendant's confession implicating Tate was inadmissible 
and unreliable. Double hearsay statements as to what the 
codefendant said to another person who then relayed the 
statements to the officer who then testified were inherently 
unreliable and admitted in violation of due process. The 
codefendant's other statements were unreliable given her self-
interest and questionable credibility. Appellant required the 
opportunity to cross-examine the codefendant as to her statements 
and the finder of fact needed to view her to assess her 
credibility. 
The remaining evidence as to a forgery failed to implicate 
Tate, also contained multiple hearsay, and required a live 
witness in order to clarify details. Additionally, the officer 
simply testified to the contents of his police report, outlining 
his investigation for the judge. Police reports offered by the 
state are unreliable; establishing a probation violation based 
solely on hearsay and multiple hearsay gathered in a police 
report violated due process. 
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The hearsay evidence admitted to support the assault 
allegation was likewise constitutionally unreliable. The 
evidence consisted solely of the testimony of two officers 
regarding statements made to them by purported witnesses. The 
information relayed by the officers raised questions as to 
memory, accuracy of perception, motivation, and soundness of 
conclusions. 
The state presented its entire case through a superficial 
summary containing few, if any, details. Appellant needed to be 
able to cross-examine the declarants as to their ability to see 
the incident and details of what they might have seen. 
Additionally, one of the hearsay declarants was a possible 
codefendant, undermining the reliability of the statements. 
Furthermore, given the problems with eyewitness identification 
testimony, the identification testimony was not reliable absent 
the ability to cross-examine regarding the Loner7/Ramirez8 
factors. 
Moreover, the record suggests that the state was having 
difficulty establishing that this alleged crime occurred through 
eyewitnesses who were under oath. The trial judge had dismissed 
a prior order to show cause based on this alleged incident since 
the state was unable to proceed at the hearing, and the state was 
also unable to proceed at the preliminary hearing. The 
suggestion in the record that the state was having difficulty 
7
 State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 488-92 (Utah 1986) 
8
 State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 779-80 (Utah 1991) 
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establishing its case through live witnesses further undermines 
the reliability of the officers' hearsay testimony as to what 
those witnesses said to the officers. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. APPELLANT'S RIGHTS TO CONFRONTATION AND DUE 
PROCESS WERE VIOLATED WHERE THE TRIAL JUDGE RELIED 
SOLELY ON HEARSAY TESTIMONY AS THE BASIS FOR REVOKING 
PROBATION. 
Although probation revocation hearings are "relatively 
informal" and " [m]ost of the rules of evidence do not apply" (see 
State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 279 (Utah App. 1990); Rule 1101, 
Utah Rules of Evidence), the probationer nevertheless has the 
right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses unless the 
trial judge makes a specific finding that good cause exists for 
not allowing confrontation. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489; 
Gacrnon, 411 U.S. at 786; Peronek, 803 P.2d at 1298-1300; Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 1998) .9 In Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 
48 9, the United States Supreme Court held that "the minimum 
requirements of due process" apply to a parole revocation 
proceeding. Since "[t]he revocation of probation implicates a 
probationer's fundamental liberty interest" (United States v. 
Holland, 850 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1988)), the procedural due 
process right applicable to parole revocation also applies to 
probation revocation. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786. Those minimum 
9
 Appellant's argument is based on the federal due process 
protection found in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, and the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. 
Although the state constitution also guarantees a right to 
confrontation and due process, Appellant does not make a distinct 
state constitutional claim. 
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requirements of due process applicable to probation revocation 
hearings include: 
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of 
(probation or) parole; (b) disclosure to the 
(probationer or) parolee of evidence against him; 
(c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present 
witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to 
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless 
the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for 
not allowing confrontation); (e) a 'neutral and 
detached' hearing body such as a traditional parole 
board, members of which need not be judicial officers 
or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the 
factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons 
for revoking (probation or) parole. 
Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 
489) (emphasis added). 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12)(d)(iii) (Supp. 1998) codifies 
the due process requirement of Morrissey and Gagnon that 
probationers have the right to confront and cross-examine adverse 
witnesses "unless the hearing officer specifically finds good 
cause for not allowing confrontation."10 Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 
786 (citing Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489). Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-
1(12)(d) states: 
(d)(i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit 
or deny the allegations of the affidavit. 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of 
the affidavit, the prosecuting attorney shall present 
evidence on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse 
information on which the allegations are based shall be 
presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the 
10
 The parole revocation statute, Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-11 
(Supp. 1998) likewise includes the requirement that parolees have 
the opportunity "to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, 
absent a showing of good cause for not allowing the 
confrontation... ." Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-11(5)(b)(iv) (Supp. 
1998) . 
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defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise 
orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and 
speak in his own behalf, and present evidence. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (12) (d) (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added); 
see Addendum B containing entire text of Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 
(Supp. 1998) . 
In the present case, the trial judge did not make a specific 
finding that good cause existed for not allowing confrontation. 
Nor did the state argue that there was good cause for not 
presenting the witnesses who provided the adverse information. 
An explicit finding of good cause by the trial judge is an 
"essential condition precedent" to the admission of hearsay 
evidence in a revocation hearing; absent such a specific finding 
by the trial court, a defendant's right to due process is 
violated by the admission of hearsay evidence at a revocation 
hearing. See State v. DeRoche, 389 A.2d 1229, 1234 (R.I. 1978) 
(where trial judge did not meet "essential condition precedent" 
of finding good cause for denying confrontation prior to 
admission of hearsay evidence, admission of hearsay evidence "was 
constitutionally impermissible"); Commonwealth v. Rossetti, 388 
A. 2d 1090, 1092 (Pa. 1977) ("by failing to make any such findings 
of good cause for abridging appellant's dual rights of 
confrontation and cross-examination, the hearing judge erred in 
admitting the hearsay testimony in question"); Commonwealth v. 
Davis, 336 A.2d 616, 624 (Pa. 1975)(same); Lawrence v. Smith, 451 
F. Supp. 179, 187 (W.D. New York 1978) (quoting Baker v. 
Wainwriaht, 527 F.2d 372, 378 (5th Cir. 1976)) ("xthere must be 
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an explicit, specific finding of such good cause, and the reasons 
should be stated in the record of the revocation hearing'"); 
State v. Alderman, 590 N.E.2d 836, 838 (Ohio 1990) ("a trial court 
may not base a revocation of probation on hearsay without making 
a specific ruling of good cause for the admission of the 
hearsay11); Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489 (right to confrontation is 
part of minimum requirements of due process applicable to 
revocation proceedings "unless the hearing officer specifically 
finds good cause for not allowing confrontation") (emphasis 
added). 
In Peronek, 803 P.2d at 1294, where the city relied solely 
on hearsay evidence at a probation revocation hearing, this Court 
stated: 
defendant's right of meaningful confrontation was 
denied, without any showing of good cause,3 when Layton 
City chose to make its case through Lieutenant 
Cunningham, who had only limited knowledge as outlined 
above, rather than through the jailer who was actually 
involved. The ensuing evidence against defendant was 
violative of the confrontation prong of the Due Process 
standard articulated in [United States v.] Holland [, 
850 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1988)]. 
3
 We note that the issue of good cause was not 
reached by the trial court since it found 
Lieutenant Cunningham to be a "qualified witness" 
under Rule 803(6). However, nothing in the record 
suggests good cause for denying the defendant this 
fundamental right. Cf. United States v. Bell, 785 
F.2d 640, 642-43 (8th Cir. 1986)(good cause might 
be found if the witness would be placed in danger 
by testifying or where producing the witness would 
cause great hardship and expense and the 
documentary evidence is demonstrably reliable-
absent such factors good cause cannot be found.) 
Peronek, 803 P.2d at 1299. While the Peronek footnote is unclear 
as to whether an appellate court might be able to review the 
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record and make an after the fact finding as to whether good 
cause exists, such a post-hearing review fails to comply with the 
requirements of Morrissey and its progeny that the trial judge 
make an explicit finding of good cause as a condition precedent 
to admitting hearsay evidence at an order to show cause hearing. 
See e.g. DeRoche, 389 A.2d at 1234; Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489; 
Rossetti, 388 A.2d at 1092. In this case where the state did not 
argue that good cause existed for allowing hearsay evidence and 
the trial judge did not make a specific finding prior to 
admission of the hearsay that good cause existed, Tate's rights 
to confrontation and due process were violated by the admission 
of the hearsay. 
Additionally, even if this Court were to review the record 
to determine at this juncture whether good cause existed for 
admission of the hearsay, "nothing in the record suggests good 
cause for denying the defendant this fundamental right." 
Peronek, 803 P.2d at 1299 fn. 3. The state did not make any 
legal argument as to why it should be permitted to put on hearsay 
evidence; nor did it present any factual information or argument 
indicating that good cause might exist for denying Tate his right 
to confrontation. (R. 88:1-3) The state offered no explanation 
for not presenting live testimony; indeed, it was simply easier 
for the state to present its case through the officers than to 
subpoena and examine the witnesses to the alleged crimes. Under 
such circumstances, reliance solely on hearsay evidence absent a 
finding or the existence of good cause violated Tate's right to 
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confrontation and due process as well as the requirements of 
Section 77-18-1(12) (d) (iii) . 
Even if good cause had existed for denying confrontation, 
Tate's right to confrontation and due process was nevertheless 
violated in this case because the hearsay was unreliable and 
cross-examination of the officer was "nothing more than an 
exercise in futility." Hill v. State, 350 So. 2d 716, 718 (Ala. 
App. 1977)(cross-examination of probation officer who had no 
firsthand knowledge rather than "the persons who originated the 
factual information which formed the basis for the revocation" 
"amounted to nothing more than an exercise in futility" in 
violation of due process); Peronek, 803 P.2d at 1298-1300. 
In Peronek, 803 P.2d at 1298-1300, the only evidence 
introduced at the order to show cause hearing which supported the 
probation violation allegation was an incident report indicating 
that Peronek had consumed alcohol. This Court concluded that 
revoking Peronek's probation based solely on that hearsay 
violated Peronek's rights to due process and confrontation. Id. 
In reaching that decision, this Court emphasized the 
importance of the right to confrontation, and the need for 
reliability when a party seeks to admit hearsay testimony in lieu 
of "live" testimony. Peronek, 803 P.2d at 1299. 
The hearsay rule long predates the Federal 
Constitution, and it is generally accepted that the 
Confrontation Clause was intended by the drafters of 
the Bill of Rights to exclude certain hearsay testimony 
even if otherwise admissible. Whether the use of 
documentary hearsay as a substitute for "live" 
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testimony is violative of the Confrontation Clause 
turns on the indicia of reliability of the document or 
statement sought to be admitted. [citations omitted.] 
Id. (footnote and citations omitted). This Court determined that 
the hearsay evidence was not constitutionally reliable since it 
did not demonstrate that the breathalyzer used to measure 
Peronek's blood alcohol level was "functioning properly, or that 
the person administering the test had the appropriate skills to 
operate the device and interpret the results, or that the record 
card appended to the incident report was an accurate reflection 
of the device's readings." Peronek, 803 P.2d at 1299. 
Some courts have found a due process violation only where 
the revocation is based solely on hearsay evidence. See Stanley 
v. State, 587 So. 2d 1258, 1259 (Ala. App. 1991)("while strict 
adherence to evidentiary formalities are not required in 
revocation proceedings, hearsay evidence may not form the sole 
basis of revocation"); Alderman, 590 N.E.2d at 838 (absent a 
specific ruling by trial judge that good cause existed for 
admission of hearsay, reliance solely on hearsay to revoke 
probation violates due process); Thompson v. State, 626 So. 2d 
1023 (Fla. App. 1993) (" [p]robation cannot be revoked solely on 
the basis of hearsay"). 
Contrary to the dictates of Section 77-18-1(12) (d) (iii) and 
due process as set forth in Gacrnon, Morrissev, Peronek, and other 
cases, the persons who gave adverse information upon which the 
allegations against Tate were based did not testify in the Order 
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to Show Cause hearing. Instead, the state used police officers 
to provide hearsay and multiple hearsay accounts of information 
they had encountered during their investigations. Indeed, the 
present case is similar to Peronek in that the revocation was 
based solely on hearsay. Tate was denied his right to meaningful 
confrontation "when [the state] chose to make its case through 
[the officers], who had only limited knowledge of [the 
incidents]." See Peronek, 803 P.2d at 1299. 
The hearsay evidence in this case was even less reliable 
than that in Peronek. In support of the forgery allegation, the 
state presented only the testimony of Officer Boddy. Boddy 
recounted statements from four people, as well as multiple 
hearsay attributed to a bank and a codefendant. (R. 88:3-13) 
The only evidence implicating Tate was Boddy's testimony 
regarding a confession and other statements allegedly made by 
Elizabeth Price, a codefendant.11 Because Price was a 
codefendant who faced serious consequences, her statements 
implicating Tate were constitutionally unreliable in the absence 
of cross-examination. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 
135 (1968)(recognizing unreliability of a codefendant's 
confession implicating defendant); Crawford v. United States, 212 
U.S. 183, 204 (1909)(recognizing lack of reliability and 
credibility of codefendant's statement implicating defendant). 
11
 Price was charged with several counts of forgery and 
entered into a plea bargain dismissing at least one of the counts 
and including a sentencing recommendation for probation. (R. 88: 
20-1) 
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Boddy testified that Price confessed to him, saying that she 
cashed six checks which "were handed to her by Tate." (R. 88:11) 
The United States Supreme Court recognized the unreliability of a 
codefendant's confession which implicates a defendant in Bruton, 
3 91 U.S. at 13 5. After pointing out that in some contexts, a 
limiting instruction will not undo the harm of admitting certain 
evidence, the Court stated: 
Such a context is presented here, where the powerfully 
incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant 
who stands accused side-by-side with the defendant are 
deliberately spread before the jury in a joint trial. 
Not only are the incriminations devastating to the 
defendant but their credibility is inevitably suspect, 
a fact recognized when accomplices do take the stand 
and the jury is instructed to weigh their testimony 
carefully given the recognized motivation to shift 
blame to others. [footnote omitted.] The 
unreliability of such evidence is intolerably 
compounded when the alleged accomplice, as here, does 
not testify and cannot be tested by cross-examination. 
It was against such threats to a fair trial that the 
Confrontation Clause was directed. 
Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135-36 (footnote and citation omitted) 
(emphasis added). Due to the "substantial threat" to Bruton's 
right to confrontation caused by the admission of a codefendant's 
confession, the Court reversed Bruton's conviction even though 
the jury had been instructed to disregard the statements about 
Bruton. 
Admission of Price's confession violated Tate's right to 
confrontation and due process just as admission of the 
codefendant's confession violated Bruton's right to confrontation 
and due process. The Bruton doctrine applies where a statement 
is "powerfully and facially incriminating with respect to the 
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other defendant and must directly, rather than indirectly, 
implicate the complaining defendant in the commission of the 
crime." State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188, 190 (Utah 1987). The 
confession Price allegedly made to Officer Boddy fits these 
requirements since Boddy said Price told him Tate cashed six 
checks. See R. 88:11. Hence, Price's confession implicating 
Appellant was unreliable, as recognized by Bruton, and admitted 
in violation of due process. 
In addition, the remaining statements attributed to Price 
were unreliable. Price had approached Marks "and asked her to 
fill out the check and she wouldn't do it, so [Price] said, I'll 
get Lethron to do it." (R. 88:12, 16) Marks told Boddy that 
Price wrote out the check and that Marks did not see Appellant 
pass any checks. (R.88:17, 9) Marks also said that Price told 
her that she had called Appellant and told him she would blame 
everything on him. (R. 88:18) This evidence suggests that Price 
was at least the primary, if not the only, participant in the 
forgeries. Price's self-interest and obvious involvement in the 
crime emphasizes the unreliability of any statements allegedly 
made by her as well as the need for confrontation. The trier of 
fact needed to be able to observe Price to assess her credibility 
and Tate needed to be able to cross-examine her to point out 
weaknesses in her claims. 
Additionally, Boddy's testimony about what Marks said Price 
had said was multiple hearsay and inherently unreliable. 
Admission of such unreliable multiple hearsay violated Tate's 
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right to due process. See State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1071-
73 (Utah 1993) . In Johnson, the Utah Supreme Court held that a 
report which contained double and triple hearsay indicating that 
the defendant had sexually abused his niece was inherently 
unreliable, presenting a "high probability for inaccuracy" and 
therefore failed to meet the due process requirements of a 
sentencing proceeding. Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071. The Court 
referred to the multiple hearsay evidence in Johnson as "hearsay 
and rumor." Id. at 1073. The error in admitting double and 
triple hearsay is even more glaring in a probation violation 
hearing, where the defendant has the right to confront adverse 
witnesses. Hence, Johnson applies to a probation violation 
hearing and indicates that admission of the double and triple 
hearsay attributed to Price violated Tate's right to due process. 
The double and triple hearsay attributed to Price included: 
(1) Boddy's testimony that Marks told him that she had knowledge, 
apparently from Price, that Appellant "had passed a couple of 
checks ... through Elizabeth Price" (R. 88:9), (2) Boddy's 
testimony that Marks told him that she "was privy to information 
and the conversations between Lethron Tate and Elizabeth Price" 
(R. 88:9), (3) Boddy's summary of the information he received 
from Marks, which Marks had received from Price: 
that the checks were indeed stolen, they were being 
passed and the blame was being passed back and forth as 
to who was going to take the fall for this. Statements 
by Lethron Tate to Elizabeth Price that, you know, he 
wasn't going down alone, that everyone else was going 
with us, as well, and this included Amanda Calouza, his 
girlfriend. 
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(R. 88:9-10); and (4) Boddy's testimony that Marks told him that 
Price had told her that Price was going to blame everything on 
Appellant (R. 88:18). 
This testimony was inherently unreliable and essentially 
rumor. Tate was unable to cross-examine Marks about the details 
of any "knowledge" she might have that he had passed checks. It 
is uncertain from Boddy's testimony regarding what Marks told him 
whether Marks actually observed anything involving Tate, or was 
merely told things by Price. It is also uncertain whether Marks 
overheard conversations between Price and Tate, or whether Price 
simply relayed her version of any conversations they might have 
had to Marks. Boddy did not supply details as to how Marks 
gained her information or specifics as to what she was told. 
Tate was unable to subject the general statement that Marks told 
the officer that she knew Tate was passing checks to any scrutiny 
or obtain any details regarding her knowledge. Appellant needed 
to be able to cross-examine Marks to ascertain what, if anything, 
Marks had observed. Additionally, Tate was unable to question 
Price regarding any statements she made to Marks or any claims 
she might have made regarding their conversations. Utilization 
of this type of rumor and inherently unreliable hearsay violates 
due process. See Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071. 
Further hearsay attributable to Price was also unreliable. 
See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135-36; Crawford, 212 U.S. at 204 
(recognizing the lack of reliability and credibility of a 
codefendant's statement implicating a defendant). Boddy 
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testified that Price originally told him that she did not know 
who was committing the forgeries. (R. 88:10-11) She changed her 
story only after she was informed that the officers had proof of 
her involvement. (R. 88:10, 17) Once she knew the police were 
on to her, Price "admitted to accepting two or three checks" that 
she had gotten from Appellant while at Denny's. (R. 88: 10) She 
also told Boddy that Tate was keeping the checks in his house or 
his car, and that he cashed the checks through her. (R. 88:11) 
Price's admission to Boddy that she accepted two or three 
checks from Tate and that Tate cashed the checks through her is 
significantly different from Marks' statements that Price had the 
checks, was filling them in, asked Marks to pass some checks, and 
presented the checks to Appellant, who was at the cash register. 
(R. 88:12-13, 16)12 Her statements to the officer when compared 
to her statements to Marks, suggest that when talking to the 
Officer, Price minimized her own role and shifted the bulk of the 
12
 According to Boddy, Price told him that Tate had presented 
three checks. (R. 88:11) After reviewing his police report, Boddy 
changed Price's statement to be that she took six checks from 
Appellant. (R. 88:11) This testimony coupled with the hearsay 
attributable to Marks failed to establish how many checks were 
passed and whether Tate or Price passed the checks. Moreover, 
Boddy testified that only five checks were relevant to the Order to 
Show Cause. Boddy's confusion about the number of checks Price 
admitted cashing coupled with his testimony that only five checks 
were involved resulted in a confusing and uncertain record as to 
what Tate might have done, i.e. whether he cashed the checks or 
passed them, and the number of checks with which he might have been 
involved. Boddy also testified that Price told him Amanda Calouza, 
Tate's girlfriend, had passed five of the checks. (R. 88:11) 
Since only five of the checks were drawn on Woelfel's account, the 
other three to seven checks referred to did nothing to establish a 
forgery and were merely further unreliable hearsay placed before 
the trier of fact. 
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blame to Appellant. Because Price was a codefendant who was 
facing criminal charges arising out of the same incident as Tate, 
her statements to Boddy were unreliable and should have been 
subjected to cross-examination in order to pass constitutional 
muster. 
Without the hearsay, double hearsay and triple hearsay 
attributable to Price, the state had no evidence linking 
Appellant to the forgeries. The statements Boddy attributed to 
Woelfel and Thompson at most demonstrated that Woelfel had not 
written the checks. These statements failed to tie Tate to the 
crime. 
Additionally, the remaining evidence was unreliable and 
should not have been admitted in the absence of confrontation. 
Some of the statements Boddy attributed to Woelfel and Thompson 
were multiple hearsay and inherently unreliable pursuant to 
Johnson. Boddy testified that Woelfel told him that new checks 
had been mailed to her, removed from her mailbox and "passed all 
over town" including at Denny's. (R. 88:5) This testimony was 
dependent on the statements others made to Woelfel. Boddy's 
testimony that Thompson told him that Thompson "was told by the 
banks" that Woelfel had not written the checks was also triple 
hearsay which was made even more unreliable by the failure to 
name anyone responsible for such statements. Because such 
statements were unreliable and essentially amounted to nothing 
more than rumor, admission of the multiple hearsay violated due 
process. See Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071-73. 
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In addition to the unreliability of the hearsay as outlined 
above, Officer Boddy's hearsay testimony was unreliable and 
admitted in violation of due process since it was essentially a 
police report offered by the prosecution to establish its case. 
See State v. Bertul. 664 P.2d 1181, 1184-85 (Utah 1983). In 
Bertul, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that police reports 
which are offered by the state are unreliable and are 
inadmissible under the rules of evidence. 
On the other hand, police reports containing non-
routine information as to which the memory, perception, 
or motivation of the reporter may raise a serious 
question of reliability, are inadmissible. 
Furthermore, statements by witnesses to a crime and 
recorded by officers are not made in the regular course 
of the witness' business and do not have the indicia of 
reliability associated with routine and regularly 
recorded entries upon which reliance is placed by an 
organization. [citations omitted.] Thus, the 
"circumstances of their preparation" are not such "as 
to indicate their trustworthiness," as required by Rule 
63 (13) . 
Furthermore, since police reports of the factual 
events and details of a criminal case are generally 
made for the purpose of successfully prosecuting a 
crime, the reasons which might otherwise provide a 
basis to assume reliability of such reports as business 
records do not exist where police reports are offered 
by the prosecution in a criminal proceeding. 
Bertul, 664 P.2d at 118413 (emphasis added and citations 
omitted). 
Moreover, the Court recognized that admission of police 
reports to prove the state's case can impinge upon the right to 
confrontation. Bertul, 664 P.2d at 1185. 
13
 Rule 63(13) has been replaced by Rule 803(6), Utah Rules 
of Evidence. 
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Although the reports may not be readily describable as 
"dripping with motivation to misrepresent," their 
exclusion is more fundamentally explainable on the 
ground that substantial rights under the confrontation 
clause of the United States Constitution, and 
especially the right to cross-examination, may be 
severely prejudiced when the information in the report 
calls into question the motivation and the accuracy of 
perception, recall, the manner of language usage, or 
the soundness of conclusions by the author of the 
report. [citation omitted.] It would be "error and 
ordinarily reversible error to receive an exhibit 
containing 'a neat condensation of the government's 
whole case against the defendant'" in the form of a 
police report for which there can be no effective 
cross-examination. [citations omitted.] We have long 
ago forsaken the practice of allowing a person to be 
convicted on the basis of out-of-court statements, 
whether written or oral, of persons not subject to 
cross-examination. 
Id. at 1185 (citation omitted). Although the confrontation issue 
arose in Bertul during trial, the confrontation concerns 
expressed in the opinion are likewise applicable to a probation 
revocation proceeding where a defendant has a due process right 
to confront the witnesses against him. 
In the present case, Officer Boddy's report was made in 
anticipation of litigation. He had trouble remembering the 
details of the report and reviewed it during the course of his 
testimony. Reliance on Boddy's testimony regarding the contents 
of the report prejudiced Tate's right to confrontation and due 
process since "the information in the report calls into question 
the motivation and the accuracy of the perception, recall, the 
manner of language usage, [and] the soundness of [Boddy's] 
conclusions." Bertul, 664 P.2d at 1185. The fact that Boddy's 
testimony was a recitation of his police report further 
demonstrates the unreliability of the hearsay testimony. 
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The hearsay evidence offered in support of the first 
allegation was likewise unreliable and admitted in violation of 
Tate's right to confrontation and due process. The state relied 
solely on the hearsay testimony of two investigating officers to 
present its case. 
Reliance on an officer's testimony regarding the contents of 
his file is unreliable pursuant to Bertul. See discussion supra 
at 28-30. The officers' testimonies contained hearsay 
conclusions that Tate had assaulted Hanson without specifics as 
to whether the declarant actually observed the incident or, if 
so, the declarant's ability to see the incident or precise 
details of what occurred. The information relayed by the 
officers raised questions regarding the witnesses' memory, 
accuracy of perception, motivation, and the correctness of the 
conclusions which could not be explored since the witnesses were 
not present. Just as it would be reversible error to base a 
conviction on a police report "containing xa neat condensation of 
the government's whole case against the defendant'" (Bertul, 664 
P.2d at 1185) (citations omitted)), it was reversible error to 
revoke probation based solely on the officers' testimony which 
was " xa neat condensation of the government's whole case against 
the defendant.'" See id. 
Adding to the unreliability of the hearsay testimony 
regarding the allegation that Appellant committed an aggravated 
assault is the fact that the state had been unable to proceed at 
either the preliminary hearing or a prior order to show cause 
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hearing on the aggravated assault allegation. (R. 49) The 
state's inability to proceed suggests that the state had witness 
problems, and that the state would have been unable to establish 
under oath the information the officers gathered in their 
reports. Indeed, the statements made to the officers were not 
under oath or subjected to cross-examination, and despite three 
hearings at which witnesses could have appeared, testimony had 
not been taken from any of the purported witnesses. 
Additionally, the officers' hearsay testimonies raised 
questions as to the details of the incident and were based on 
vague and conclusory statements made to them. The witness who 
called police had not seen the fight. (R. 88:30) Officer 
Salazar testified that another unnamed witness told him that a 
car had rapidly left the parking lot, and a restaurant employee 
hat and shirt with the name tag "Josh" had fallen off the car. 
(R. 88:30) Without knowing the name of this witness and any 
motive he might have to not be truthful, or the ability to cross-
examine the witness as to details such as whether he saw the car 
speed away and saw the shirt and hat on it, this testimony by 
Salazar has no reliability. 
There were two Joshes at the restaurant and Salazar talked 
to one of them. (R. 88:31) He did not know Josh's last name. 
(R. 88:31, 34, 35, 39)14 According to Salazar, the Josh he 
14
 It is not clear whether Salazar's information came from 
Josh Marquette, a possible codefendant, or Josh Wagstaff. The 
existence of the two Joshes and the uncertainty as to who might 
have made the statements to Salazar further undermines the 
reliability of the hearsay Officer Salazar attributed to "Josh." 
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talked to told the officer that his friend "Tate" committed an 
assault. (R.88:31) This is a conclusory statement which should 
have been subjected to cross-examination. The specifics of what 
Josh actually said to Salazar are not clear; Salazar acknowledged 
that Josh might have said "Lethron" and the other officer said he 
was told that "Lee" was the perpetrator. (R. 88:32, 35) Cross-
examination of Josh was critical to establish whether he 
indicated a specific name like Lethron or Tate, or a more general 
name like Lee. Cross-examination was also critical to determine 
what exactly Josh had witnessed. If Josh only witnessed the end 
of the fight, his statement that Lee had assaulted Hanson was 
meaningless since he was not in a position to know. Moreover, 
cross-examination of eyewitnesses is critical in an eyewitness 
identification case to determine whether the identification 
testimony is constitutionally reliable under the factors set 
forth in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 488-92 (Utah 1986) and 
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 779-80 (Utah 1991). 
Additionally, one of the Joshes, apparently Josh Marquette, 
was present when the alleged assault occurred, may have sped away 
in the car, and was a potential codefendant. (R. 88:30, 39) The 
unreliability of codefendant statements further undermines the 
reliability of Salazar7s hearsay testimony. See discussion supra 
at 21-23, 26-27. 
Moreover, the officer conducted his interview with "Josh" over the 
phone, so "Josh" was never even subjected to the credibility 
assessment police officers apply when interviewing witnesses face 
to face. 
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The hearsay attributed to Josh Wagstaff was also unreliable 
in the absence of cross-examination. Although Officer Kent said 
Wagstaff said he was outside, it is not clear whether Wagstaff 
could clearly see the altercation, or whether he received his 
information from others. (R. 88:39, 35) Tate was also unable to 
subject Wagstaff's conclusion that Tate assaulted Hanson to 
cross-examination. In fact, when defense counsel asked Officer 
Kent whether she asked the Joshes "who first hit who," the 
officer simply reiterated that there had been a verbal exchange, 
then the assault occurred. (R. 88:39) In response to defense 
counsel's next question, the officer testified Josh said 
Appellant hit Hanson one or two times. (R. 88:40) When asked 
again whether she had asked the Joshes if Hanson initially took a 
swing at Tate, the officer responded, "Yes. Nobody said anything 
other than that the assault on Mr. Tate (sic) came out of the 
blue." (R. 88:40) This vague response fails to answer directly 
whether Hanson swung at Tate.15 Appellant needed to be able to 
cross-examine witnesses about what they actually saw and whether 
they would have been able to see if Hanson or Josh Marquette had 
taken a swing. 
Finally, the statements of the alleged victim, Steve Hanson, 
were unreliable and required cross-examination. While Hanson 
indicated to Officer Kent that a Black male hit him "out of 
nowhere," he was somewhat vague as to what occurred. (R. 88:39) 
15
 The officer's response could mean yes he asked and no one 
responded to the question. 
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This vagueness coupled with the question as to why Hanson had not 
previously appeared under oath as a witness demonstrates the 
unreliability of the hearsay supporting this allegation. 
In addition, Kent's statement that Hanson picked Appellant 
out of the photo spread is not sufficiently reliable. The 
vagaries of eyewitness identification are well documented. See 
Long/ 721 P.2d at 488-92; Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 779-80. Absent 
the ability to cross-examine Hanson as to the facts relevant to 
the Loner/Ramirez factors, the hearsay testimony regarding 
Hanson's identification was not constitutionally reliable. See 
generally State v. Nelson, 950 P.2d 940, 944 (Utah App. 
1997)(trial court's failure to rule on admissibility of 
eyewitness identification testimony is reversible error). 
The right to confrontation is "one of the core elements of 
the right to due process of law." State v. Webb, 779 P.2d 1108, 
1111 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted.) The right allows an 
individual the "opportunity, not only of testing the recollection 
and sifting the conscience of the witness," but also of requiring 
the witness to appear before the factfinder so that the 
factfinder can assess demeanor, bias and credibility of the 
witness. Webb, 779 P.2d at 1111-12. 
In the present case, Tate was deprived of his right to 
confrontation and due process when the trial court did not make 
the required finding of good cause for not allowing confrontation 
prior to admitting the hearsay testimony. In addition, the 
record does not suggest that good cause existed for admitting 
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hearsay in this case. Finally, even if good cause existed for 
denying Tate his right to confrontation, admission of the hearsay 
violated Appellant's right to due process since the hearsay 
testimony was unreliable. In this case where the state relied 
solely on hearsay testimony to establish the probation violation 
allegation, Appellant's right to confrontation and due process 
was violated.16 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's rights to confrontation and due process were 
violated where the trial judge revoked his probation based solely 
on hearsay and multiple hearsay testimony from police officers 
who investigated the crimes alleged in the Order to Show Cause. 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court vacate the order 
revoking his probation. 
SUBMITTED this J?/<a*r day of April, 1999. 
^ya^L^c t<£2y 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
STEPHANIE AMES 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
16
 Reversal is required where the state relies solely on 
hearsay to establish the allegations. This is so because the 
defendant is prejudiced by the admission of the hearsay evidence. 
Tate was prejudiced in this case since without the hearsay 
evidence, the state did not prove the allegations. 
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1 officer who did the investigation on the Allegation 
2 No. 2 regarding the forgery charge. At this time I 
3 would make the objection to the officer testifying. 
4 I understand that at an order to show cause hearing 
5 the evidentiary rules do not necessarily apply; 
6 however, the Constitution does still apply regarding 
7 evidentiary hearings. Based on that, I would be 
8 making a due-process objection. Pursuant to Layton 
9 City v. Parrot (phonetic), probation revocation 
10 hearings must be fundamentally fair so as to satisfy 
11 the due-process clause. At a minimum it requires the 
12 right to confront and cross-examine adverse 
13 witnesses. 
This officer took witness statements from 
15 other individuals. There is no possible way that I 
16 can attack and address the credibility of those 
17 witnesses' statements. In fact, one of the main 
20 involved in passing checks. That person was the 
21 individual who later tries to point the finger at my 
22 client, Lethron Tate. Based on that there are a 
23 number of credibility issues of motive, of bias, that 
24 this officer would have no personal information to be 
25 able to testify to. I'm completely prohibited from 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 THE COURT: Good morning. This is the 
3 time set for an evidentiary hearing in the matter of 
4 the State of Utah versus Lethron Tate. The case is 
5 971900272. 
6 Appearances, please. 
7 MS. TAYLOR: Lana Taylor on behalf of the 
8 State. 
9 MS. AMES: Stephanie Ames appearing with 
10 the Defendant, Lethron Tate, Your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: Thank you. You may proceed. 
12 MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, the State would 
13 first call Officer - Detective Boddy to the stand. 
14 RICHARD L. BODDY, called 
15 as a witness on behalf of the State, after having 
16 been duly sworn, testified as follows: 
17 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
18 BY MS. TAYLOR: 
19 Q. Please state and spell your name for the 
20 record. 
21 A. Richard L. Boddy, B-o-d-d-y. 
22 Q. Where are you currently employed? 
23 A. West Valley City. 
24 MS. AMES: Your Honor, excuse me for 
25 objecting, but at this time I understand this is the 
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1 any ability, based on their putting on this officer, 
2 to confront the necessary evidence that would be 
3 needed here, Your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: Thank you. Your objection is 
5 overruled. This is a civil proceeding, and we'll let 
6 the State proceed. 
7 MS. TAYLOR: where are you currently 
8 employed? 
9 A. West Valley City Police. 
10 Q. In what capacity? 
11 A. I'm a Detective. 
12 Q. And are you assigned to any particular 
13 unit? 
14 A. Yes, I am assigned to Property Squad. 
15 Q. And in that capacity did you investigate 
16 a forgery complaint at Denny's Restaurant? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. Where is that located? 
19 A. That's located in West Valley City at 
20 2222 West 3500 South. 
21 Q. And on what day did you investigate a 
22 matter there? 
23 A. The original complaint was filed on 
24 February 12th, 1998. My investigation started 
25 shortly thereafter. 
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1 Q, And what steps did you take to 
2 investigate a forgery that occurred at Denny's? 
3 A. Well, first I collected — obviously take 
4 the checks that had been passed at Denny's . And I 
5 collected those from Denny's and from other 
6 collection resources. 
7 Q. H o w many checks did y o u collect? 
8 A. Twenty-seven. 
9 Q. A n d do all o f those checks contain the 
10 same name, same account? 
11 A. Negative. There were two different 
12 accounts involved, t w o different banks involved, and 
13 two different owners o f the checking accounts. 
14 Q. Okay. A n d w h o were the two different 
15 owners on those checks? 
\\6 A. Well , on the first batch, it was Antonio 
17 C. Ascencio . A n d on the second group -
18 THE COURT: How do you spell the last 
19 name? 
20 THE WITNESS: A-S-C-e-n-C-i-O. 
21 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
22 THE WITNESS: And then the second group 
23 of checks was Brenda Lee Woelfel , W-o-e-l-f-e-1. 
24 MS. TAYLOR: And did you have occasion to 
25 speak with either one of those individuals? 
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1 A. I did with Brenda Woelfel . 
2 Q. A n d what information did she give you 
3 regarding these checks? 
4 A. She had received the checks in her mail , 
5 and the checks were subsequently taken out of the 
6 mailbox. And shortly after that these checks were 
7 being passed all over town, and quite a few of them 
8 at Denny's . 
9 Q. A n d did you ever show her those checks 
10 that you have in your possess ion now? 
11 A. Yes , w e had statements from her saying 
12 that she was not the author of those checks. 
13 Q. In speaking with Brenda, did she ever 
14 state that she had given anyone permission to use her 
15 name on those checks? 
16 A. N o . And, again, I refer to the 
17 statements that she wrote out saying that she was not 
18 the author, which also included a statement from her 
j 19 that she authorized no one. Even, in fact, it was a 
20 brand new batch that hadn't even been received by 
J2l herself yet. 
122 Q. Okay. D i d y o u ever speak with the second 
!23 - the owner of the second batch of checks? 
24 A. No. 
25 Q. Did you receive any information about the 
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1 status o f those checks? 
2 A. The status of those checks? W e verified 
3 that those were stolen, as wel l , but w e never really 
4 - and this batch of checks is not an issue in this 
5 hearing because w e never were able to establish w h o 
6 passed that batch. 
7 Q. Okay, thank you. H o w many checks are 
8 there in the first batch in the name of Brenda? 
9 A. With Brenda, there's three, four ~ I 
10 have five of them here. 
11 Q. Okay. And under what circumstances did 
12 you learn that those checks had been passed? 
13 A. Information came to us from the manager 
14 at Denny ' s and as wel l as the vict im that they were 
15 receiving the checks from collection agencies. 
16 Q. D o you recall w h o that was , who the 
17 manager was that y o u spoke to? 
18 A. I think his name w a s Larry Thompson. 
19 There was quite a few people involved here, so it's 
20 kind of confusing to try to keep it all very straight 
21 here. 
22 MS. AMES: Your Honor, I would just 
23 interject, there appears to be another witness in the 
24 courtroom. I'm not sure if (Inaudible) charges 
25 involves this charge or not, but I'll invoke the 
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1 Exclusionary Rule. 
2 MS. TAYLOR: And, Your Honor, he is not 
I 3 involved in the case that's presently being heard. 
4 THE COURT: okay . Well , the Exclusionary 
5 Rule has not been asked for until now, so witnesses 
6 could be present. If there are witnesses that you 
7 anticipate calling hereafter, they should be observed 
8 and sent out of the courtroom. 
9 MS. TAYLOR: Okay. 
10 THE WITNESS: It w a s Larry Thompson. He 
j 11 was the manager of the Denny ' s in West Val ley at 2 2 2 2 
12 West. 
13 MS. TAYLOR: Thank you. A n d in speaking 
14 with him, what were the circumstances under which he 
15 had discovered the forged checks? 
16 A. He was told by the banks, and because o f 
17 the affidavits that were fi led by the vict im on the 
18 checks, in this case Brenda Woelfel , that these 
19 checks were not again authored by herself and that 
20 she at no t ime ever issued, wrote or authored any of 
21 the checks at the Denny's . 
22 Q. A n d so were those checks returned to the 
23 Denny ' s Restaurant unpaid? 
24 A. Yes . 
25 Q. And what is the amount - the total 
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1 amount on the checks? 
2 A. Let's see... 
3 Q. Or how much is each check written out 
4 for? 
5 THE COURT: Just recite the number — or 
6 the amount for each check. 
7 THE WITNESS: Okay. We have $70.33, 
8 59.87, 51.76, 80.25 and 80.50. 
9 MS. TAYLOR: And in speaking with 
10 Mr. Thompson, did he tell any circumstances which led 
11 to a suspect? 
12 A. He did, and several names actually came 
13 up, and that's because checks were passed at a 
14 certain time when certain employees were present. 
15 Q. And did he give you the name of those 
16 employees? 
17 A. He did. He gave the names of Julie Marks 
18 (phonetic), Elizabeth Price, Lethron Tate. And those 
19 were the three employees, and then there was another 
20 person that was involved by the name of Amanda 
21 Calouza (phonetic) that is not an employee of 
22 Denny's, or at least was not. 
23 Q. Did you have occasion to speak with Julie 
24 Marks? 
25 A. I am sorry. What was that? 
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1 Q. Did you speak with Julie Marks? 
2 A. I did. 
3 Q. What information did she give you? 
4 A. She said and she also wrote it in her ' 
5 statement that she was approached by Elizabeth Price 
6 to cash a check and that she also had knowledge that 
7 Lethron Tate had passed a couple of the checks there 
8 through Elizabeth Price. 
9 Q. Did Julie Marks see Lethron Tate pass any 
10 checks? 
11 A. No, she didn't. 
12 Q. What information did Julie Marks tell you 
13 that led you to believe that those checks had been — 
14 that Lethron Tate had participation in the passing of 
15 the checks? 
16 A. She was privy to the information and the 
17 conversations between Lethron Tate and Elizabeth 
18 Price. She had become a roommate with Elizabeth 
19 Price and was present during conversations at 
20 Elizabeth Price's house and Lethron Tate's house in 
21 Salt Lake. 
22 Q. Could you tell the Court what information 
23 you had about those conversations you had? 
J 24 A. In summary, the conversations were that 
25 the checks were indeed stolen, they were being passed 
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1 and the blame was being passed back and forth as to 
2 who was going to take the fall for this. Statements 
3 by Lethron Tate to Elizabeth Price that, you know, he 
4 wasn't going to go down alone, that everybody else 
5 was going to go with us, as well, and this included 
6 Amanda Calouza, his girlfriend. 
7 Q. Did you speak with Elizabeth Price? 
8 A. I did. 
9 Q. And what information did she give you? 
10 A. Well, she at first denied any 
11 involvement. And then when we presented the checks 
12 that she accepted, she changed and recanted her 
13 story,. And then in a post-Miranda statement, she 
14 admitted to accepting two or three of the checks. 
15 And I say two or three because she wasn't exactly 
16 sure how many she had gotten, and that she had gotten 
17 those directly from Lethron at Denny's, and that she 
18 had received money in return for those checks. 
19 Q. She took money — I am sorry. You said 
20 she took money. Was that funds (Inaudible) Denny's 
21 still? 
22 A. She did. I think she received $20 on the 
23 first two, and then it went up from there. She got 
24 at least double that on the last check. 
25 Q. And did Ms. Price tell you where those 
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1 checks come from? 
2 A. I am sorry. She what? 
3 Q. Where the checks initially come from? 
4 A. Well, she knew that Lethron Tate was 
5 keeping them either in the house or in his vehicle, 
6 and he was the one that actually came to her when she 
7 cashed out for the meals at Denny's. 
8 Q. And did Ms. Price tell you who had filled 
9 out those checks? 
10 A. She said specifically three of these here 
11 that are in the plastic bags, that those are the ones 
12 that Lethron actually filled out, and the others he 
113 had given to Amanda Calouza, his girlfriend, and she 
! 14 passed five of those. 
15 Q. And did she state that she had seen 
16 (Inaudible) herself? 
17 A. Give me one second here. I am referring 
18 to my statement here, my report in this case. She 
19 said she took a total of six checks. All of these 
20 checks were handed to her by Tate. And on one 
21 occasion, she took one check from Calouza, which 
22 included the meal and cash back. 
23 I am sorry. There is quite a few papers 
24 here and lots of reports and addendums here. Would 
25 you ask me the last question? 
9 
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1 Q. Did Miss Price ever tell you that she had 
2 seen Lethron fill out the checks? 
3 A. I have to go to her witness statement 
4 here. 
5 Q. How about do you recall mentioning, 
6 during the course of your investigation, who had 
7 actually filled out the checks? 
8 A. If I recall -- and this is from the 
9 interview with Elizabeth Price - she was presented 
10 the checks by Lethron, but I don't think she ever 
11 actually saw him sit and fill the checks out. He 
12 just presented the checks to her. 
13 Q. Did Miss Price ever state that she was in 
14 possession of any of the blank checks from 
15 Miss Woelfal's account? 
16 A. She was - according to Julie Marks, she 
17 had been in possession of a couple of those checks. 
18 And I referred to Julie Marks' written statement. 
19 And she said that, "Elizabeth Price had two checks in 
20 her possession at the time she wanted me to write out 
21 the check. Lethron was working as a server that 
22 evening, and they wrote out of the checks, and then 
23 went up to the register and gave Lethron the checks 
24 and he then gave her the money for them." 
25 Q. So Miss Price had filled out the checks 
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1 and given them to Lethron (Inaudible)? 
2 A. And then she saw her give Lethron the 
3 check, and Lethron gave the money (Inaudible) checks. 
4 MS. AMES: (Inaudible) Officer, where 
5 were you reading that last statement from? 
6 THE WITNESS: Statement from the Julie 
7 Marks dated... 
8 MS. TAYLOR: Is that a handwritten 
9 statement? 
10 A. There's one here that's March 3rd of 
11 '98. 
12 Q. And that is a statement that Miss Marks 
13 gave to you? 
14 A. I am sorry. 
15 Q. Is that a statement that Miss Marks 
16 filled out for you? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. What are the names that are showing on 
19 the checks? 
20 A. All of the names that are signed on here 
21 were the name of the person who held the account, and 
22 that would be Brent Woelfal. 
23 Q. How much money did Miss Price tell you 
24 that she received from those checks? 
25 A. Again, I'm going to refer to her 
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1 statement. February 12th, she said she got back 
2 about $30. 
3 Q. And what — I am sorry. 
4 A. And then she got another check here, and 
5 she says, "I gave him $60 of that check," and she 
6 kept the balance. 
7 Q. And what did Miss Price say that the rest 
8 of the money from those two cashed checks went to? 
9 A. The rest of the money was kept by 
10 Lethron. 
11 MS. TAYLOR: I have no further questions 
12 of this witness. 
13 THE COURT: cross-examination. 
14 MS. AMES: Thank you, Your Honor. 
15 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
16 BY MS. AMES: 
17 Q. First a couple of questions for 
18 clarification, Officer. You were reading over a 
19 statement when you said that she gave him $60 and 
20 kept the rest for herself. What document are you 
121 referring to? 
22 A. A statement written by Elizabeth Price on 
23 3-31 of f98. 
24 Q. Okay, thank you. 
25 Officer, you received a number of 
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1 different statements from Elizabeth Price; is that 
2 correct? 
3 A. I - two. 
4 Q. You spoke to her on two different 
, 5 occasions or did you speak to her more frequently 
j 6 than those two times? 
7 A. We spoke more frequently than just the 
| 8 two, but she actually wrote out two statements. 
9 Q. And in the first statement that she gave 
10 you she wrote that she had been working at Denny* s 
11 for five years and wasn't aware of anything -- of who 
12 was writing the checks; is that correct? 
13 A. That's true. 
14 Q. And then shortly after that you received 
15 a statement from Julie Marks; is that correct? 
16 A. That's correct. 
117 Q. And Julie, in her statement - how many 
18 statements - let me go back and ask how many 
19 statements did you get from Julie Marks? 
20 A. I have two statements. 
21 Q. Okay. Both of those look like they are 
22 two-paged, handwritten statements; is that correct? 
23 A. That's correct. 
24 Q. And her first statement she told you that 
25 Elizabeth had approached her and asked her to fill 
Page 12 - Page 15 
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1 out the check and she wouldn't do it, so Elizabeth 
2 said, "I'll get Lethron to do it"; is that correct? 
3 A. That's what she wrote here. 
4 Q. But Julie didn't actually observe Lethron 
5 filling out any checks; is that correct? 
6 A. No, not in that statement. 
7 Q. Did she at any time tell you that she 
8 observed Lethron filling out any checks? 
9 A. One moment, please. No. 
10 Q. What Julie said that she did observe was 
11 that Elizabeth had handed an already filled out check 
12 to Lethron who was at the cash register and that he 
13 gave her cash for that check; is that correct? 
14 A. Are you referring to the statement with 
15 3-3 of'98? 
16 Q. Yes, and in any other statements that you 
17 have (Inaudible) to the best of your recollection. 
18 A. No, she said that Elizabeth had handed 
19 checks to Lethron and he cashed them at that time, 
20 and that's on March 3rd of '98, was her statement. 
21 Q. And what she said was that Lethron was 
22 working as a server that evening, Liz then wrote out 
23 the checks and went up to the register and gave 
24 Lethron the check and he gave her the money for them; 
25 is that correct? 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. Okay. She did not overhear any 
3 conversation at the register at that time; did she? 
4 A. Not when -- not at that time when he 
5 actually gave the money back for the check. 
6 Q. She didn't observe Lethron evaluating the 
7 check or questioning Elizabeth as to whether this was 
8 her check, whether she had authorization to pass that 
9 check; is that correct? 
10 A. She didn't hear — I don't know what the | 
11 conversation was between the two of them when they 
12 passed that particular checks. 
13 Q. Okay. But all that you are aware of was 
14 that she observed Lethron accepting a check that was 
15 written out to Denny's for cash and giving the amoimt 
16 of cash that was — that was equivalent to that 
17 check; is that correct? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. Now, Julie also told you that she was 
20 privy to some conversation between Elizabeth and 
21 Lethron; is that also correct? 
22 A. That's true. 
23 Q. But she didn't tell you anything about 
24 the contents of those conversations; did she? 
25 A. No, she didn't write it on her 
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1 statement. No. 
2 Q. Okay. So there's no specific information 
3 as to what contents of those conversations were; is 
4 there? 
5 A. I have to answer that with no. 
6 Q. Okay. And Julie also told you that or 
7 it's also written in her statement that, "Liz had 
8 called her and said that she had just talked to 
9 Lethron and she had told him that she was going to 
10 blame everything on him, and he had said, 'what?', 
11 and she said what else was she to do, she has four 
12 kids. He hung up on her." 
13 A. That's in her statement 
14 Q. Now, going to Elizabeth Price, because 
115 she's the individual who tells you that Lethron is 
16 actually involved in this and gives you some specific 
17 information that he is involved in passing these 
18 checks; is that correct? 
19 A. Are you referring to Elizabeth? 
20 Q. Uh-huh, Elizabeth Price. 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. And you first had a statement with 
23 Elizabeth and she says she doesn't know anything 
24 about it? 
25 A. That's true. 
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1 Q. And then you find out from Julie that 
2 she's called Julie and told her that she wants to 
3 know if Julie is the one who's telling on her pretty 
4 much. Is that what Julie tells you? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. And Julie's quite concerned about — 
7 about Liz at that point; is that correct? 
8 A. That's true. 
9 Q. And then Elizabeth also tells her that 
10 she's talked to Lethron, and she tells Lethron she is 
11 going to blame it on him; is that correct? 
12 A. Well, I got just what, on that 
13 conversation, that she wasn't going to take, yeah, 
14 the entire criminal charges. 
15 Q. Well, specifically what Julie told you 
16 was that, "Liz had called again and said she had just 
117 talked to Lethron and she told him she was going to I 
118 blame everything on him. He said, 'What?', and she 
119 said what else was she to do, she has four kids." j 
20 A. That's what she wrote in her statement. 
21 Q. And it is after that point that Elizabeth 
22 points the finger at Lethron; is that correct? 
23 A. I am sorry. Say that again. 
24 Q. It is after that point that Elizabeth 
25 points the finger at Lethron, she talks to you folks 
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1 again? 
2 A. She did. 
3 Q. Okay. A n d that's the t ime that she tells 
4 you that he is actually involved in it, he's the one 
5 w h o got the checks and she's just gotten some money 
6 from it; is that correct? 
7 A. That's correct. 
8 Q. A n d she had criminal charges against her 
9 at that t ime; is that correct? 
10 A. She did. She admitted to accepting or 
11 passing three o f the checks. 
12 Q. A n d a plea negotiation w a s worked out 
13 with her based upon s o m e o f statements that she told 
14 the police; is that correct? 
15 A. That's correct. 
16 Q. A n d based on that, to your understanding, 
17 she w a s g iven some reduced charges and some 
18 sentencing benefits because o f that; is that 
19 correct? 
20 A. I don't think the charges were reduced. 
21 I think that they dropped one, she pled to two or 
22 something along that line. It wasn' t necessarily 
23 reduced in severity because they were just Third 
24 Degree Felonies at any rate. 
25 Q. Okay. So they d ismissed at least one 
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1 charge, maybe some other charges and she pled to some 
2 others — 
3 A. Uh-huh. 
4 Q. - all at the same level; is that 
5 correct? 
6 A. Yes . 
7 Q. A n d the State also made some sentencing 
8 recommendations for probation; is that correct? 
9 A. Yes . 
10 MS. AMES: I have n o further questions. 
11 THE COURT: Any redirect? 
12 REDIRECT EXAMINATION I 
13 BY MS. TAYLOR: I 
14 Q. When did y o u first speak with Elizabeth 
15 Price? 
16 A. I have it as the 4th o f March, 1998 . 
17 Q. A n d do y o u recall w h i c h information — I 
18 you stated that she fi l led out a statement. Is that | 
19 the same one that y o u were referring to earlier? 
20 A. Yes , she fi l led out a statement saying 
21 that she had no knowledge about anybody or anything 
22 or any involvement in the checks . 
23 Q. When w a s the second t ime that y o u spoke 
24 with M i s s Price? 
125 D i d y o u speak with her on March 31st? 
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1 A. Yes . 
2 Q. A n d at that t ime, in your interview wi th 
3 her then, did she admit to receiving any checks from 
4 Lethron? 
5 A. Yes , she said that - she admitted that 
6 she accepted t w o checks from Lethron Tate (Inaudible) 
7 Lethron girlfriend, A m a n d a Calouza, w a s present. 
8 Q. A n d in those transactions where she 
9 accepted those t w o checks, w a s that whi le M i s s Price 
10 w a s employed at the restaurant? 
11 A. Yes . 
12 Q. A n d what did M i s s Price do in return for 
13 those checks that Lethron had given her? 
14 A. I f m not sure I understand. 
15 Q. What w a s the procedure that she fo l lowed 
16 when Lethron gave her the checks? 
17 A. She cashed the checks and received a 
18 portion of the monie s , and then the balance w a s g iven 
19 to Lethron. 
20 MS. TAYLOR: Okay. I have no further 
21 questions. 
22 THE COURT: Anything further of this 
23 witness? 
24 MS. AMES: No. 
25 THE COURT: Thank you. Y o u m a y step 
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1 down. 
2 Your next wi tness? 
3 MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, if I m a y step 
4 outside (Inaudible). 
5 GILBERT SALAZAR, called as a 
6 witness on behalf o f the State, after having been 
7 duly sworn, testified as follows: 
8 THE CLERK: Would y o u please spell and 
9 state your name for the record. 
10 THE WITNESS: Gilbert Salazar, 
J11 S-A-L-A-Z-A-R. 
12 THE COURT: Yes. 
113 MS. AMES. Your Honor, I wou ld make an 
14 objection and mot ion to dismiss the Allegation N o . 1, 
! 15 which I understand this witness wi l l be testifying 
16 to, based upon State v . Bricky (phonetic). This w a s 
17 a probation violat ion that w a s charged and fi led 
18 against Mr. Tate. W e had an evidentiary hearing on 
19 it I bel ieve in August and the Court at that t ime 
20 dismissed the order to show cause based upon the 
21 State not having any witnesses or evidence to proceed 
22 in that matter. Under State v . Bricky, the due 
23 process clause o f the Utah Constitution prohibits 
24 refiling a criminal charge without a further showing 
25 o f additional ev idence or other good cause. This 
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1 witness was not known at that evidentiary hearing. 
2 There is no additional evidence that's being 
3 presented today (Inaudible). 
4 THE COURT: Are you suggesting that a 
5 criminal charge was filed at that time, that when 
6 there was an order to show cause, that that's a 
7 criminal charge being filed? 
8 MS. AMES: Your Honor, I'm making the 
9 analogous argument that the allegation is equivalent 
10 to a criminal charge. The Defendant faces the 
11 possibility of incarceration, loss of his liberty. 
12 And subsequently filing the same allegation when that 
13 was adjudicated previously and dismissed by the Court 
14 is inappropriate. 
15 THE COURT: And I need to be sure that 
16 ITm understanding accurately what you are saying. 
17 That wasn't adjudicated by the Court because it was 
18 dismissed for failure to prosecute; right? 
19 MS. AMES: That's correct 
20 THE COURT: okay. So it wasn't 
21 adjudicated. 
22 MS. AMES: I apologize for using the 
23 wrong term. 
24 THE COURT: okay. The second thing is 
25 that this is not filed as a criminal charge. This is 
Page 25 
1 filed as a civil matter in violation - it alleges 
2 criminal conduct which constitutes violation of his 
3 probation. But this was filed as an order to show 
4 cause. So the first order to show cause was simply 
5 dismissed for failure to prosecute, and the same 
6 allegation now is raised in a follow-up or second 
7 order to show cause. And the matter has never been 
8 considered on its merits. Is that an accurate 
9 statement? 
10 MS. AMES: That's correct, Your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: okay. All right. 
12 MS. AMES: However, I would just state 
13 that even though this is considered by the Court as a 
14 civil procedure, the defendant's constitutional 
15 rights of due process still apply, and I'm basing m y 
16 argument on that. 
17 THE COURT: (Inaudible) there has been no 
18 prejudice that that's occurred to him. 
19 MS. AMES: Well, Your Honor, the 
20 situation that is somewhat similar in Bricky is that 
21 although they had put on some witnesses, there was 
22 another one who was not put on the first hearing who 
23 was later put on the second one who would have been 
24 available in the first one, as well. The Supreme 
25 Court in that case found that there was no additional 
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1 evidence that was available to the court at that 
2 preliminary hearing that had not been available 
3 beforehand. 
4 THE COURT: Now, Bricky is a criminal 
5 proceeding; right? 
6 MS. AMES: That's correct, Your Honor. 
7 THE COURT. So it is not an order to show 
8 cause, it is not something that the standard of 
9 evidence is a preponderance? 
10 MS. AMES: But an order to show cause is 
11 still a critical stage of the proceedings for the 
12 defendant. The United States Supreme Court and State 
13 Supreme Court have both stated that the 
14 Constitutional provisions, the right to confrontation 
15 and the right to due process, apply to probation 
16 revocation hearings. 
17 THE COURT: O k a y -
18 MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, if I may? 
19 According to m y file when the State was here on 
20 August 11th, then at that time the State (Inaudible) 
21 proceed. They moved for that to be stricken. The 
22 Court granted that. And there is a notation here 
23 that AP&P was entitled to the refile that if there 
24 are any new charges that are brought up. M y 
25 understanding is that it was with the — the 
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1 allegation was withdrawn by the State and the Court 
2 allowed that and also allowed that allegation to be 
3 refiled at another time. 
4 THE COURT: The Minute Entry of the Court 
5 says that, "Ms. Ames states that the underlying case 
6 in this matter was unable to proceed to preliminary 
7 hearing because witnesses were not available, and the 
8 preliminary hearing in that matter was continued and 
9 the Defendant released from custody on that day." 
j 10 That's separate from m y case. That is a matter 
11 proceeding in another criminal matter. "Mr. Harnets 
12 (phonetic) states that he is unable to proceed today 
! 13 because no one from AP&P was present," and files a 
14 motion for a continuance. "The Court dismisses the 
15 order to show cause as the State is not ready to 
16 proceed at this time. The Court orders the Defendant 
17 released forthwith from custody. The same prior 
18 terms and conditions of probation will apply. The 
19 Defendant's ordered to report to AP&P." 
20 That doesn't look to me like there was 
21 any prejudice in terms of anything that was conducted 
22 in that hearing. The Court simply dismissed the case 
23 for the State's failure to proceed. That doesn't 
24 mean that the State is barred from re-filing and 
25 re-proceeding on the same matter. 
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1 So your motion in that regard is denied. 
2 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
3 BY MS. TAYLOR: 
4 Q. Where are you currently employed? 
5 A. Salt Lake City Police Department. 
6 Q. Were you so employed on April 29th of 
7 this year? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. Did you have an occasion to investigate 
10 an assault on that day? 
11 A. On that evening, yes. 
12 Q. Okay. Approximately what time was that? 
13 THE COURT: what was that date again? 
14 MS. TAYLOR: April 29th (Inaudible). 
15 THE COURT: April 29th? 
16 MS. TAYLOR: Yes, Your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: Thank you. 
18 MS. TAYLOR: Approximately what time 
19 (Inaudible) the matter (Inaudible)? 
20 A. I got the call a little after 10:00 
21 o'clock. 
22 Q. Okay. And what location did you respond 
23 to? 
24 A. To nth South 2100 - 1300 East 2100 
25 South, the Kentucky Fried Chicken parking lot. 
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1 Q. And in the course of your investigation, 
2 what did you do? 
3 A. I arrived there and I located a man that 
4 was down on the ground on the north side of the 
5 restaurant in the parking lot. And he was — 
6 appeared to be beat up quite a bit. 
7 Q. Did you speak with him? 
8 A. I tried to talk to him, but he could not 
9 talk very much because he was so injured. 
10 Q. Okay. Did you eventually get his name? 
11 A. Yes. His name was Steven Hanson. 
12 Q. And what type of injuries did it appear 
13 that he was suffering from? 
14 A. Facial and head injury. He did say 
15 something to me at the scene, if I can go back to 
16 that? 
17 Q. Sure. 
18 A. He said that a black guy beat him up. 
19 Q. Okay. What specifically - specifically 
20 what type of injuries did you see on his face? 
21 A. Injuries around his face, eyes. Blood 
22 was coming out of his nose, ears. And he did have 
23 some injuries to the back of his head. 
24 Q. Okay. And what steps did you take to 
25 investigate this matter? 
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A. After medical, I responded and took him 
to the hospital. I talked to the witness or the 
person who called the police (Inaudible). This 
person said he did not see the assault. He just saw 






























rapidly from the parking lot. 
Q. Okay. Did you speak with any other 
witnesses at that time? 
A. Well, I talked to the personnel at 
Kentucky Fried Chicken that were there in the 
restaurant. Also by talking to them, I found out the 
name of a person that may have been at the scene of 
the assault. 
Q. And how did you discover that? 
A. When this - the witness — the person 
who reported the incident to us said that when the 
car left rapidly from the parking lot, some clothing 
fell off the car. 
Q. And what was that? 
A. And it was Kentucky Fried Chicken hat and 
shirt. 
Q. Okay. And was any information regarding 
that shirt discovered? 
A. Yes, there was a name tag named "Josh." 
Q. Did you contact anyone or speak with 
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anyone by the name of Josh? 
A. Yes. While I was at the hospital waiting 
to interview the victim, I was able to contact Josh, 
the employee at Kentucky Fried Chicken. 
Q. And what (Inaudible) last name was? 
A. I don't recall offhand. 
Q. Okay. And what information did he give 
you? 
A. He told me that a friend of his named 
10 Tate was the one that assaulted the victim there at j 
11 Kentucky Fried Chicken, but he did not have any more 














Q. Did he witness the assault? | 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did he tell you how it started? 
A. He said - Let's see. I am talking about 
independent recollection on this. He said the victim 
came out and there were some words exchanged and the 
victim was assaulted by the suspect. And Josh told 
me over the phone that he kept on telling the suspect 
to stop beating him. 
MS. TAYLOR: All right. Thank you. 
I have no further questions. 
THE COURT: Cross-examination. 
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1 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
2 BY MS. AMES: 
3 Q. Officer, actually what he told you was 
4 that the person's first name was Lethron; correct? 
5 That was the conversation that you had with Josh? 
6 A. I don't recall (Inaudible) my 
7 independent... 
8 Q. But he was only able to give you one 
9 name? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. He didn't know any other information on 
12 that individual? 
13 A. Actually he did. He knew approximately 
14 where he lived, but he didn't know any more 
15 information. I don't think he really wanted me — to 
16 tell me anything. 
17 Q. Okay. So that's all the information that 
18 you obtained from that individual; is that correct? 
19 A. Yes, Ma'am. 
20 Q. You did not make any more specific 
21 identification of the individual that he was 
22 referring to; is that correct? 
23 A. That's correct. 
24 MS. AMES: Nothing further, Your Honor. 
25 MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, the State has no 
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1 case. The first thing that I did was attempt to 
2 contact the witnesses involved. The first witness I 
3 spoke with was Josh Marquette (phonetic). I am not 
4 sure if that's pronounced correctly. I spoke with 
5 him up at the Kentucky Fried Chicken where this 
6 incident happened. When I spoke with him, he 
7 explained to me that he and some friends were 
8 standing outside of the restaurant in the parking 
9 lot, and that our victim had been in the restaurant 
10 and came out. There was some words exchanged over a 
11 Jazz game that had just happened. They were making 
12 comments back and forth. And that a young man named 
13 Lee or Lethron, is what he knew, that was a friend of 
14 an ex-co-worker, who was also present, and that he 
15 had gone over and that he had assaulted our victim. 
16 Q. All right. Did he have any other 
17 information about the incident? 
18 A. What he told me is that and that this Lee 
19 lived with a young lady named Amanda Calouza. 
20 Q. Okay. And what - how did he describe 
21 the assault that occurred? 
22 A. He wasn't real detailed about what had 
23 occurred. He just said that there was an assault, 
24 that he had seen him a couple of times, that he just 
25 whacked him real hard and the kid went down. 
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1 more questions of this witness. 
2 MS. AMES: Nor I. 
3 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. You 
4 may step down. 
5 (Discussion off the record) 
6 KELLY KENT, called as a 
7 witness on behalf of the State, after having been 
8 duly sworn, testified as follows: 
9 THE CLERK: will you please state 
10 and spell your name for the record? 
11 THE WITNESS: My name is Kelly Kent. 
12 K-e-H-y K-e-n-t. 
13 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
14 BY MS. TAYLOR: 
15 Q. Where are you currently employed? 
16 A. Salt Lake City Police Department. 
17 Q. In what capacity? 
18 A. Homicide Detective. 
19 Q. Did you investigate an assault that 
20 occurred on April 29th at Kentucky Fried Chicken on 
21 13 th East? 
22 A. I did. 
23 Q. What steps did you take in the 
24 investigation? 
25 A. I was assigned the follow-up on this 
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1 Q. The suspect is (Inaudible)? 
2 A. Uh-huh. And that the victim went down. 
3 Q. Okay. Did you speak with any other 
4 witnesses (Inaudible)? 
5 A. Yes. I also spoke with Josh Wagstaff, 
6 who was also an employee up at (Inaudible). He said 
7 basically the same thing, that they were outside, 
8 there were some words exchanged and that Lee, as he 
9 knew him, had assaulted Mr. Hanson, our victim. 
10 Q. All right. Did he add anything further? 
11 A. He added the same thing, that Lee — he 
12 didn't know his last name, but that he lived with or 
13 was the boyfriend of Amanda Calouza. 
14 Q. Okay. Did he give any description of 
15 injuries or what happened to the victim? 
16 A. He just said that he was hurt real bad 
17 and that he was unconscious. 
18 Q. Okay. Did you speak with the victim in 
19 this case? 
20 A. I did. 
21 Q. And what information did he give you? 
22 A. Initially when I spoke with him he had 
23 just been released from the hospital. He was staying 
24 up at his folks' home. He told me the injuries that 
25 he had sustained, that he was in the hospital 
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1 unconscious for some time due to what he called a 
2 brain hemorrhage. He couldn't remember a whole lot 
3 about this case other than there was some exchanges 
4 of words and that out of nowhere this black male that 
5 was in the parking lot hit him, and that's what he 
6 remembered of the assault. 
7 Q. Was he able to identify who the person 
8 was that hit him? 
9 A. Yes, he was. He did say that he did get 
10 a good enough look at him that he can remember what 
11 he looked like. 
12 Q. And how was he able to identify Lethron 
13 Tate? 
14 A. The identification was done through a six 
15 photo photospread. 
16 Q. And (Inaudible)? 
17 A. I did. 
18 Q. And who did he pick out (Inaudible)? 
19 A. He picked out Lethron Tate. 
20 Q. Out of the photospread that you put 
21 together? 
22 A. Yes, he did. 
23 Q. Is there any other information 
24 (Inaudible) criminal investigation? 
25 A. What he said about when he looked at the 
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1 photospread is he picked out Lethron Tate but said 
2 that his hair is different. The photospread that I 
3 had, the photo that I used, was a booking photo from 
4 January of 1997. Mr. Tate's hair had been shaved 
5 during this photo, so all six of the photos had a 
6 bald head. And Mr. Tate had hair at that time of the 
7 assault. 
8 MS. TAYLOR: Thank you. 
9 No further questions. 
10 THE COURT: Cross-examination. 
11 MS. AMES: Thank you, Your Honor. 
12 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
13 BY MS. AMES: 
14 Q. Do you have a copy of that photo lineup 
15 that you used? 
16 A. I do. I have the original. 
17 MS. AMES: May I approach, Your Honor? 
18 THE COURT: You may. 
19 THE WITNESS: (Handing). 
20 MS. AMES: What you provided me is six 
21 different photographs (Inaudible); is that correct? 
22 A. That's correct 
23 Q. And these were photographs that you 
24 showed Mr. Hanson? 
25 A. Yes, those are the actual photographs. 
Page 38 1 
1 Q. And how did you present these to 
2 Mr. Hanson? 
3 A. Just as you see them. They are folded 
4 over. There are no names showing. The numbers 1 
5 through 6 are present up in the corner. 
6 Q. Okay. What discussions did you have with 
7 Mr. Hanson before you showed him these photos, if 
8 any? 
9 A. I explained to him that I was going to 
10 show him six photographs similar in appearance and 
11 asked him if he would look through them. And if he 
12 did so if he recognized the person that he believed 
13 to be the person who assaulted him to point that 
14 out. And that's all that was said. 
15 Q. Okay. And what was the date again that 
16 you (Inaudible) these photographs to Mr. Hanson? 
17 A. It was May 20th. 
18 Q. Approximately a month after the incident; 
19 is that correct? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. Did you have any further discussions with 
22 Mr. Hanson as to what words were exchanged, the 
23 specifics of what happened or have you provided 
24 everything that you recall him telling you? 
25 A. Yeah. He was somewhat vague on 
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1 remembering exactly what was said in the exchange 
2 that took place between the two. He said it was 
3 pretty much just out of the blue. 
4 Q. And neither of the other individuals that 
5 you talked to were close enough to have heard what 
6 had gone on between the two individuals; is that 
7 correct? 
8 A. Well, yes, they were. That's where their 
9 information from the Jazz game came from was from 
10 both Josh Marquette and Josh Wagstaff. 
11 Q. Did you ask either one of them as to who 
12 first hit who under the circumstances? 
13 A. Yes. Let me make sure that I tell you 
14 exactly which Josh said which. 
15 It was Josh Marquette, and it was 
16 standing out - Josh Marquette - let me make sure. 
17 I don't want to tell you an untruth. 
18 I'm mistaken. It was Josh Wagstaff that 
19 made the comment, told me that - the word exchange 
20 had to do with the Jazz game and that the Jazz 
21 sucked. And he said that Lethron and Josh Marquette 
22 were both over with the victim when the assault | 
23 happened, that Marquette had actually walked over 
24 with Lethron Tate over to the victim, Mr. Hanson. 
25 Q. Okay. And what he told you was that 
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1 Lethron had hit Mr. Hanson one or two times; is that 
2 correct? 
3 A. Uh-huh. And that he went down. They 
4 panicked and left. 
5 Q. Did you ask him whether Mr. Hanson had 
6 taken any swings at Mr. Tate initially? 
7 A. Yes. Nobody said anything other than the 
8 assault on Mr. Tate (sic) came out of the blue. 
9 Q. So they both told you that they had been 
10 able to observe Mr. Hanson? 
11 A. Yes, they were all right there in the 
12 parking lot. 
13 MS. AMES: I have no other questions of 
14 this witness. 
15 THE COURT: Anything further of this 
16 witness? 
17 MS. TAYLOR: Nothing, Your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: okay. Thank you, Miss Kent. 
19 You may step down. You may be excused. 
20 MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, the State has no 
21 further witnesses. 
22 (Discussion off the record.) 
23 THE COURT: All right. The State rests? 
24 MS. TAYLOR: Yes, Your Honor. 
p THE COURT: Miss Ames. 
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1 MS. AMES: Yes, Your Honor. Regarding 
2 Allegation No. 2 — 
3 THE COURT: Do you wish to call any 
4 witnesses? 
5 MS. AMES: Oh, I am sorry. I apologize. 
6 No, the Defense calls no witnesses. 
7 THE COURT: Thank you. 
I 8 You wish to argue? 
| 9 MS. TAYLOR: Yes, Your Honor. With 
110 regard to the first allegation, the Forgery charge, I 
II believe there*s been enough evidence to show 
12 (Inaudible) by a preponderance that there was a check 
13 that was not authorized — six checks, in fact — 
14 that were not authorized by the account holder, 
15 Ms. Brenda Woelfel, that those were passed at Denny's 
16 and that on one occasion that Lethron Tate had 
17 accepted the check, had cashed it out and given money 
18 back to a co-worker and that on that occasion he 
19 received - I believe the evidence was that on that 
20 incident that (Inaudible ) co-worker cashed a check 
21 for Miss Fivey (phonetic). 
22 On two other occasions evidence shows 
23 that Mr. Tate took the checks to the co-worker, 
24 Ms. Price, gave them to her and received money back 
25 for those. I believe that establishes forgery in 
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1 that he issued a check or authenticated a check on 
2 occasion that was not authorized to be issued by its 
3 owner knowing that it was not the work of the owner 
4 and that in the authentication or issuance of that 
5 that it purported to be the act of another. 
6 With regard to the allegation - the 
7 second order to show cause allegation, the assault 
8 charge -
9 THE COURT: Now, I might say that my 
10 affidavit is in the opposite order of that. 
11 MS. TAYLOR: Oh, is it. 
12 THE COURT: The amended affidavit I have 
13 is the assault charge first and the forgery second. 
14 You've presented your evidence otherwise, but I just 
15 want to be sure that we are referring to the same 
16 amended affidavit 
117 MS. TAYLOR: Yes, Your Honor. With 
118 regard to the first allegation, the aggravated 
i 19 assault charge which occurred second, there's been 
(20 evidence that the victim was assaulted, was punched 
|2l in the face a couple of times, that he fell to the 
22 ground, that he was knocked unconscious, that he went 
23 to the hospital and suffered a brain hemorrhage as a 
24 result of the injury. The witnesses at the scene 
25 identified Lethron as the person who walked up and 
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1 hit him without being in any danger himself. Also 
2 the suspect — the victim identified the suspect as 
3 Lethron Tate. (Inaudible) enough evidence 
4 (Inaudible) the assault did take place. 
5 THE COURT: Thank you. 
6 Mr. Tate, you understand that you have 
7 the right to present evidence in this proceeding. Do 
8 you understand that? 
9 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: With consultation with your 
11 attorney, I'm assuming that you wish not to testify; 
12 is that correct? 
13 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
14 THE COURT: All right. 
15 Argument. 
16 MS. AMES: Yes, thank you, Your Honor. 
17 I'll address them in the same order the counsel has 
18 because the evidence was presented that way, and 
19 that's regarding Allegation No. 2 first, that being a 
20 forgery allegation. The only objective evidence that 
21 has any connection with Lethron Tate on this is that 
22 of Julie Marks, who told the officer that she 
23 observed Elizabeth Price hand already filled out 
24 checks to Lethron Tate, that he gave her the cash for 
25 that check. Now, Your Honor, that does not rise to 
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1 the standard of a forgery. Forgery requires that the 
2 State show that the party to the offense did it with 
3 the purpose to defraud. There is an intent element 
4 to that crime. Oftentimes, and I would assume most 
5 frequently, when a cashier takes a check from an 
6 individual, they look at who it's made out to and 
7 what the amount is for. There's been no evidence 
8 that Lethron was aware that that check was fraudulent 
9 and intentionally provided the cash to Elizabeth 
10 Price with the intent to defraud Denny's . And that's 
11 the only objective evidence that w e have. The only 
12 other information — all the other information that 
13 w e have comes through an Elizabeth Price, an 
14 individual who is not present here today, who I have 
15 not been able to cross-examine regarding her issues 
16 of credibility, of bias, of motive, et cetera, which 
17 is very necessary to the defense. 
18 THE COURT: Now, let's make one thing 
19 certain: You have had all o f these names in a report 
20 and you have elected not to subpoena them. 
21 MS. AMES: Your Honor, the State's 
22 obligation -
23 THE COURT: I know. I know. 
24 MS. AMES: - is to prove the charges 
25 against the defendant. 
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1 THE COURT: That's true. But you have 
2 every right to bring forward any of these witnesses 
3 that you wish to examine or cross-examine in this 
4 proceeding. 
5 MS. AMES: I understand that, Your 
6 Honor. But it is — just so that the Court is clear, 
7 it is the Defense's position that the Defendant does 
8 have a constitutional right, a Sixth Amendment right 
9 to confrontation, that it's the State's burden to 
10 bring in the sufficient evidence to present these 
11 charges to the Court by a preponderance of evidence 
12 and that they have not provided that testimony. So 
13 that's the (Inaudible). 
14 THE COURT: okay . But I do want the 
15 record to be clear that the State certainly has 
j 16 called witnesses that were police officers, that were 
17 investigative officers that recorded their testimony 
j 18 based on their actual conversations with victims, 
'19 witnesses or others related to alleged offenses. The 
20 Defendant has every right to subpoena anyone w h o m the 
21 Defendant wants to have at a hearing such as this for 
22 the purpose of examining the accuracy of their 
23 statement told to the police, and the Defendant has 
24 elected not to do that through counsel. 
25 MS. AMES: That's correct, Your Honor. I 
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1 would just add the caveat that it was the Defense's 
2 initial objection that the officers be able to 
3 testify to those hearsay conversations with these 
4 witnesses because of the Constitutional issue which 
5 I've already addressed and lack the reliability that 
6 the Defendant feels is present in those type of 
7 hearsay communications. 
8 But, g iven that, the only information 
9 that the State has presented that links anything to 
[ 10 Mr. Tate is that through this Elizabeth Price, an 
111 individual who was pinpointed at first and caught 
! 12 red-handed regarding these checks. She's the 
! 13 individual who other witnesses were able to 
14 substantiate had to be in charge to get others to 
15 fill out those checks. From the statement of Julie 
16 Marks, she told her when Julie said that she was not 
17 going to do it, that she'd get Lethron to do it. 
18 There was no further evidence that he had actually 
19 done that other than through Elizabeth's written 
20 statement. 
21 Additionally, from Julie Marks' 
22 statement, Elizabeth had told her that she had had a 
23 (Inaudible) conversation with Lethron, that she had 
24 told h im that she was going to blame everything on 
25 him because she had a lot to risk because she had 
Page 47 
1 four kids. So there is a lot of motive for false 
2 testimony by Elizabeth Price, for her blaming it on 
3 somebody else and to get the blame off of her. And, 
4 in fact, that's what happened, some charges were 
5 dismissed and she had some leniency given to her 
6 because of that. 
7 The evidence that has been presented that 
8 — from Liz Price through the officer is not 
9 credible evidence. The only objective evidence does 
10 not meet the standard for a forgery charge at all. 
11 Regarding the Aggravated Assault charge, 
12 on that I would submit it given the evidence that has 
13 been presented by the State noting the same objection 
14 has been made regarding the hearsay testimony of that 
15 witness . 
16 Other than that, I would submit it, Your 
17 Honor. 
18 THE COURT: All right. A n y reply? 
19 MS. TAYLOR: No, Your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: All right. The Court finds 
21 the Defendant to be in contempt of court provided in 
22 the terms and conditions of his probation. The Court 
23 finds that the State has borne its burden, that 
24 clearly in the first allegation - and I'm stating 
25 them in the order o f the affidavit, that is the 
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1 Aggravated Assault, there is clear evidence that the 
2 victim identified the Defendant from the six-picture 
3 lineup, there was no dispute or challenge to that. 
4 There's clear evidence that other witnesses, two 
5 named Josh ~ let's see, I think there was Josh 
6 Marquette and Josh Wagstaff - each were present when 
7 the assault occurred, there was little provocation, 
8 simply came out of the blue and it was over something 
9 as trivial as a dispute over the Jazz game. So the 
10 Court finds that there has been, by a preponderance 
11 of the evidence, the first allegation established. 
12 Now, as to the second allegation of 
13 Forgery, the Court finds that the State, again, has 
14 borne its burden of proof by a preponderance of the 
15 evidence. It has established that the account holder 
16 had not authorized anyone to use the checks on the 
17 account, that the checks had never ultimately been 
18 received; apparently they had been intercepted in the 
19 mail. These checks were in the presence of — or in 
20 the possession of Ms. Price, Mr. Tate, others that 
21 have been established here. Miss Price cashed the 
22 checks ~ or, actually, the Defendant cashed the 
23 check for Ms. Price but didn't give her all the money 
24 as though he were a cashier, he gave her a part of 
25 the money and kept the balance; and, thus, the Court 
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1 finds that he was certainly aware of the 
2 circumstances. 
3 On that basis the Court finds the 
4 Defendant, again, in contempt of court. 
5 Is there a recommendation from Adult 
6 Probation & Parole? 
7 MR. FRANSEN: There is, Your Honor. In 
8 light of the seriousness of the allegations and the 
9 fact that Mr. Tate is on probation for Attempted 
10 Robbery, it is our recommendation that he be 
II sentenced to the original sentence and that he be 
12 committed forthwith to the Utah State Prison. 
13 THE COURT: For the record would you 
14 state your name, please? 
15 MR. FRANSEN: Jim Fransen from Adult 
16 Probation & Parole. 
17 THE COURT: All right. The Court finds 
18 that the Defendant has violated the terms and 
19 conditions of his probation, that there is an 
20 adequate basis for the Court to now impose the 
21 original sentence of commitment. 
22 The Court commits you forthwith to the 
23 Utah State Prison on the original Attempted Robbery 
24 charge at this time. 
25 Anything further? 
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1 MS. AMES: May I have a few moments with 
2 my client, Your Honor? 
3 THE COURT: Okay. 
4 All right. The Court is in recess. 
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2
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ADDENDUM B 
77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Pleas held in abeyance 
— Probation — Supervision — Presentence in-
vestigation — Standards — Confidentiality — 
Terms and conditions — Restitution — Termina-
tion, revocation, modification, or extension — 
Hearings — Electronic monitoring. 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction 
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as 
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the 
plea in abeyance agreement. 
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction 
of any crime or offense, the court may suspend the imposition or execution 
of sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court may place the 
defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Cor-
rections except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a 
private organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing 
court, 
(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the 
department is with the department. 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of 
the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court. The court has 
continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(3) (a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence inves-
tigation standards for all individuals referred to the department. These 
standards shall be based on: 
(i) the type of offense; 
(ii) the demand for services; 
(iii) the availability of agency resources; 
(iv) the public safety; and 
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what 
level of services shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submit-
ted to the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an 
annual basis for review and comment prior to adoption by the department. 
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures 
to implement the supervision and investigation standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider 
modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3) (a) 
and other criteria as they consider appropriate. 
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an 
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations 
subcommittee. 
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required 
to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors 
or infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C 
misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the 
probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards. 
(5) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of 
sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a 
presentence investigation report from the department or information from 
other sources about the defendant. 
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact 
statement describing the effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's 
family. The victim impact statement shall: 
(i) identify the victim of the offense; 
(ii) include a specific statement of the recommended amount of 
complete restitution as defined in Subsection 76-3-201(4), accompa-
nied by a recommendation from the department regarding the pay-
ment of court-ordered restitution as defined in Subsection 76-3-201(4) 
by the defendant; 
(iii) identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a result of 
the offense along with its seriousness and permanence; 
(iv) describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial 
relationships as a result of the offense; 
(v) identify any request for psychological services initiated by the 
victim or the victim's family as a result of the offense; and 
(vi) contain any other information related to the impact of the 
offense upon the victim or the victim's family that is relevant to the 
trial court's sentencing determination. 
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific state-
ment of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the 
department regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the 
defendant in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4). 
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any 
diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, 
are protected and are not available except by court order for purposes of 
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the 
department. 
(6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report 
to the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, 
the prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to 
sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation 
report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the department 
prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing 
judge, and the judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve 
the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten 
working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a 
determination of relevance and accuracy on the record. 
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence inves-
tigation report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered 
to be waived. 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, 
or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present 
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information 
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant. 
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the defendant: 
(a) may be required to perform any or all of the following: 
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being 
placed on probation; 
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense 
Costs; 
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally 
liable; 
(iv) participate in available treatment programs; 
(v) serve a period of time in the county jail not to exceed one year, 
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use 
of electronic monitoring; 
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, in-
cluding the compensatory service program provided in Section 78-11-
20.7; 
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment 
services; 
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with 
interest in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4); and 
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers 
appropriate; and 
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997, shall be required to: 
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school gradu-
ation diploma, a GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the 
defendant's own expense if the defendant has not received the 
diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being 
placed on probation; or 
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items 
listed in Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of: 
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or 
(B) other justified cause. 
(9) The department, upon order of the court, shall collect and disburse fines, 
restitution with interest in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4), and any 
other costs assessed under Section 64-13-21 during: 
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance 
with Subsection 77-27-6(4); and 
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised 
probation and amy extension of that period by the department in accor-
dance with Subsection 77-18-1(10). 
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the 
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in 
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B 
or C misdemeanors or infractions. 
(ii) If the defendant, upon expiration or termination of the proba-
tion period, owes outstanding fines, restitution, or other assessed 
costs, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the 
defendant on bench probation or place the defendant on bench 
probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of fines, 
restitution, including interest, if any, in accordance with Subsection 
76-3-201(4), and other amounts outstanding. 
(iii) Upon motion of the prosecutor or victim, or upon its own 
motion, the court may require the defendant to show cause why his 
failure to pay should not be treated as contempt of court or why the 
suspended jail or prison term should not be imposed. 
(b) The department shall notify the sentencing court and prosecuting 
attorney in writing in advance in all cases when termination of supervised 
probation will occur by law. The notification shall include a probation 
progress report and complete report of details on outstanding fines, 
restitution, and other amounts outstanding. 
(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probati&ner outside of confinement after 
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing 
to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total 
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to 
revoke the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision 
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time 
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated 
at the hearing. 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a 
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and 
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or 
warrant by the court. 
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver 
of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in 
court that the probationer has violated the conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court 
and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts 
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the 
court that authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit 
establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or 
extension of probation is justified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to 
be served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the 
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be 
revoked, modified, or extended. 
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the 
hearing and sl\all be served upon the defendant at least five days prior 
to the hearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right 
to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel 
appointed for him if he is indigent. 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present 
evidence. 
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations 
of the affidavit. 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the 
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the 
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to 
questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause other-
wise orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own 
behalf, and present evidence. 
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of 
probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified, 
continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the 
sentence previously imposed shall be executed. 
(13) Restitution imposed under this chapter and interest accruing in accor-
dance with Subsection 76-3-201(4) is considered a debt for willful and mali-
cious injury for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in bankruptcy as 
provided in Title 11 U.S.C.A. Sec. 523, 1985. 
(14) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of 
the Division of Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a 
condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the superintendent of the 
Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the court that: 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at 
the state hospital; 
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and 
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-12-209(2)(g) are receiving pri-
ority for treatment over the defendants described in this Subsection (14). 
(15) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic 
evaluations, are classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2, 
Government Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 
63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the 
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the 
time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the 
presentence investigation only when: 
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7); 
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by 
the department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of 
the offender; 
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; 
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or 
the subject's authorized representative; or 
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence 
investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided 
that the disclosure to the victim shall include only information relating to 
statements or materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the 
crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime 
on the victim or the victim's household. 
(16) (a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of 
probation under the supervision of the department, except as provided in 
Sections 76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5. 
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home 
confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred 
to the department in accordance with Subsection (17). 
(17) (a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it 
may order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the 
use of electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order 
of the court. 
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the 
appropriate law enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions 
which require: 
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all 
times; and 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the 
defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored. 
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement 
through electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this 
section, it shall: 
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the 
Department of Corrections; 
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device 
on the defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the 
residence of the defendant; and 
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home 
confinement to the department or the program provider. 
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through 
electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to 
be indigent by the court. 
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in 
this section either directly or by contract with a private provider. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection.] the Confederacy and claims not 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid.] 
pointment.] 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec, 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint* 
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
ADDENDUM C 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
vs. 




1 JUDGEMENT, SENTENCE 
(COMMITMENT) 
Case No. <?r7f9rrtSLr) o~~. 
Count No.. 
Honorable A t f / yA S>~ CftfuSiG 
Clerk j ( j f W & S - V r 
Reporter. 
Railiff 7^ 
D a t e _ ^ s 2 Z ^ l 
• The motion of_ . to enter a judgement of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly in • granted • denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by • a jury; • the court, Q^pea of guilty; 
• plea of no contest; of the offense of _ , a felony 
of the _^T3egree, • a class misdemeanor, being now present in court and res 
represented by. . , and the State being represented by/f .i3t&f/bcQ 
irv C/ 
: ady for sentence and 
is now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
• loa nr 
G K n o t to 
 maximum mandatory term of 
exceed'five years; 
years and which may be life; 
• of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
• of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
• not to exceed years; 
Er and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ f^DTY) 
• and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ 
ffO 
to. 
i l l 47&> 
such sentence is to run concurrently with 
such sentence is to run consecutively with 





^3L Defendant is granted a stay of above ( • prison ) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of 
this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Parole for the 
period of. , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County Q for delivery to the 
Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah, or • for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be 
confined and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
Commitment shall issue 
DATED this <£/ day n p — > & p A ^ 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney Page 
Judgment/State v 
CONDITIONS OF PROBATION 
KUdsual and ordinary conditions required by the Dept of Adult Probation & Parole . 
EK^erve / y> !)?Uj^ COMrli^ ^UUL^ £fo>^4 A/U^ JOLAMJ&PJ 
inthe Salt Lake County Jail comragncmg h'LQ - _. 
CM^ay a fine in the amount of $^£^Tuat a rate to be determined by the Department of Adult Probation and 
ParpJe, or D at the rate of >^> + fcn 3 ^ % AtJ^fiJYiAfJL^ 
O-Pay restitution in the amount of $ =^_, or • in an amount to be determined by the Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole, D at a rate of ^ " ^ ,^ or D at aerate to be determined by 
the Department of Adult Probation and ParoIe^>/4/>vf • V D bx.Jbct(7Lrr\\ruzjl iH *Siff~-
D Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or treatment as 
directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole 
D Enter, participate in, and complete the program at 
D Participate in and complete any D educational, and/or D vocational training D as directed by the 
Department of Adult Probation and Parole, or D with 
D Participate in and complete any training D as directed by the Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole, or O with 
fi^ufrmit person, residence, and vehicle to search and seizure for the detection of drugs 
U^ybrnit to drug testing 
B^Npi associate with anyone who illegally uses, sells, or otherwise distrubutes narcotics or drugs. 
SH^ot frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise distributed illegally 
B^Npt use or possess non-prescribed controlled substances 
B^^ f ram from the use of alcoholic beverages 
©^Submit to testing for alcohol use 
D Take antabuse • as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole 
D Obtain and maintain full-time employment 
D Maintain full-time employment 
D Obtain and maintain full-time employment or full-time schooling 
D Maintain full-time employment or obtain and maintain full-time schooling 
D Defendant is to have no contact nor associate with 
D Defendant's probation may be transferred to under the Interstate Compact as approved 
by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole 
D Complete hours of community service restitution as directed by the Department of Adult Probation 
and Parole 
D Complete hours of community service restitution in lieu of days in jail 
D Defendant is to commit no crimes 
D Defendant is ordered to appear before this Court on ,_ for a review of this sentence.. ^ 
m/kp±4- . /fe Vo fit)xlyftjLpQJht~ ih IMPOsfijCrDaJ? gjrt/n., odjjQn&crrt) 0 y^fihn/rx? 
D u ^ //jJl-^UYU . r PSY^ « i Q 
DATED this fl~\ day of 
ADDENDUM D 
STATE OF UTAH
 f„ - -
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE r ^ jSp®* COURT 
PROTECTED 
PROGRESS/VIOLATION REP m 27 m 
LT
 LAKE COUNTY 
REGARDING: TATE, 
CASE NO.: 97-1900272 
OFFENSE: Attempted Robbery, 
a Third Degree Felony 
OBSCIS: 00122991 
ADDRESS: 1421 West 800 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
EMPLOYMENT: Applebees 
3500 South 2200 West 
West Valley City, UT 84119 
TO: SALT LAKE DISTRICT - DIV. 1 
Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah 
ATTN: Judge David S. Young 
FROM: Region III - Salt Lake City 
DATE: August 6,1998 
PROBATION DATE: April 21, 1997 
LEGISLATIVE DATE: April 20, 2000 
DEFENSE ATTY: Stephanie Ames 
COMMENTS: 
Lethron Demetruis Tate was placed on thirty-six months of supervised probation with the following 
conditions: 
1. Do not use, have in your possession or under your control alcoholic beverages or frequent places 
where alcohol is the chief item of sale. 
2. Submit to testing for the use of alcohol. 
3. Do not associate with anyone who illegally uses, sells or otherwise distributes narcotics or drugs. 
4. Do not use, have in your possession or under your control any non-prescribed, controlled substances. 
5. Submit to drug testing as ordered by Adult Probation and Parole and/or by the Court. 
6. Pay fines and fees in the amount of $ 115 6.25. 
7. Do not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold or otherwise distributed illegally. 
8. Serve 180 days in the County Jail commencing April 21,1997, with 84 days Credit for Time Served. 
9. Notify Adult Probation and Parole of all prescriptions for controlled substances. 
10. Enter, participate in and complete any Anger Management program counseling or treatment. 
11. Enter, participate in and complete any Vocational and\or Educational training or full time 
employment. 
12. Submit person, residence and vehicle to search and seizure for the detection of drugs. 
- 2 -
RE: TATE, LETHRON DEMETRUIS 
The defendant's Preliminary hearing on the Aggravated Assault charge was continued until September 15, 
1998 at 9:00 a.m. before the Honorable Judge Hutchings (case number 981910926.) 
Detective Rick Boody of the West Valley Police Department filed information alleging the defendant 
committed a Forgery on or about January 1, 1998. The defendant appeared at an arraignment before the 
Honorable Judge Barrett on August 5, 1998. He had council appointed at that time. This case is scheduled 
for roll call August 11, 1998, before the Honorable Judge Durrant (case number 981915032.) 
IMMEDIATE ACTION TAKEN BY THE AGENT: 
NOTIFY SUPERVISOR AND COURT. 
RECOMMENDATION: 
This is provided to the Court as an update and to support the amended allegation of Forgery. Additional 
information will be supplied as it is obtained. 
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IN THE SALT LAKE DISTRICT - DIV. 1 COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
VS 
:AMENDED 
Plaintiff, :AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
:ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
TATE, LETHRON DEMETRUIS :COURT CASE NO: 97-1900272 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
Defendant, :JUDGE: David S. Young 




JIM FRANSON, being duly sworn upon an oath deposes and says that: He is a Probation 
Officer for the Utah State Department of Corrections; that on the 3rd day of March, 1997, the 
above-named defendant was adjudged guilty of the crime of Robbery, a Third Degree Felony, in 
the above-entitled Court and on the 21st day of April, 1997, was sentenced to serve a term of 
0-5 years in the Utah State Prison; that the execution of the imposed sentence was stayed and the 
defendant was placed on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections; that 
the above-entitled defendant did violate the terms and conditions of the defendant's probation as 
follows, to-wit: 
A i< M i\ ~ *) 
RE: TATE, LETHRON DEMETRUIS 
i) By having committed the offense of Aggravated Assault on or about April 29, 1998, in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah in violation of condition number three of the Probation 
Agreement. 
By having committed the offense of Forgery on or about January 1, 1998, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah in violation of condition number three of the 
Probation Agreement. 
WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that an Order to the Court issue directing and requiring 
the above-named defendant to be and appear before said Court to show cause, if any he/she has, 
why the aforesaid period of probation should not be revoked, and why said defendant should not 
be forthwith committed to the Utah State Prison. 
SIM FRANSONTPROBATION OFFICER 
Subscribed and sworn to before me/tnis .iSknEy of ( X u i u . V 1 9 Q V . 
! ^ * _ 3 ^ 3 - ^ 
"wo i AKV P U B L I C " ! NOTARY PUBLIC 
DEONA SORENSEN 
275 East 200 South 
f l ' L * k e Ci'y. Utah 84111 
My Commission Expires 
February 7, 2001 
_ S T A T E O F H T A « 
Residing: Salt Lake City, Utah 
Commission expires: 
0 ((si 0 5 4 
ADDENDUM E 
^5SR.«P*r 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT 




STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




EVIDENTIARY HEARING, POST 
SENTENCE JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
NOTICE 
W 
Case No: 971900272 FS 
Judge: DAVID S. YOUNG 
Date: October 27, 1998 
PRESENT 
Clerk: taunah 
Prosecutor: LANA TAYLOR 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): STEPHANIE AMES 
Agency: Adult Probation & Par 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: April 6, 1977 
Video 
Tape Number: 102798 Tape Count: 8:37 
CHARGES 
ATTEMPTED ROBBERY (amended) - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 03/03/1997 Guilty Plea 
HEARING 
fies on direct and cross examination, 
estifies on direct and cross examination. 
Det Richard L Boddy testi 
COUNT: 9:13 
Officer Gilbert Salazar t 
COUNT: 9:25 
Det. Kelly Kent testifies on direct and cross examination. 
COUNT: 9:35 
Both sides rest. Closing arguments by respective counsel. 
COUNT: 9:43 
The Court finds defendant 
probation re allegation #1 
in contempt of court for violation of 
aggravated assault, that the State has 
ceT=-rHAr ms r* A TRUE COPY 
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•?F' •> i u . t O ' ^ B f i O-.: ,JL »rt THE THIRL 
P'- ' • - r COURT SALT LAAE COUHTY &TATV 
Of U7/- - ^ 
DATE 
Case No: 971900272 
Date: Oct 27, 1998 
met the burdon of proof on this allegation. 
The Court finds defendant in violation of court re allegation #2 
forgery, and finds the State has met the burdon of proof re this 
allegation. 
Jim Fransen, AP&P makes recommendation of imposing original 
sentence of prison. 
The Court imposes the original prison sentence of 0-5 years and 
the defendant is ordered commited forthwith to the Utah State 
Prison. 




The defendant is remanded to the custody of the Department of 
Corrections at the Utah State Prison for incarceration. 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals 
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative 
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Third 
District Court at 238-7300 at least three working days prior to the 
proceeding. The general information phone number is (801)238-7300. 
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